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The world is getting hotter and it is happening at a rate which humanity is not prepared to
manage. This temperature increase is not merely due to the change of seasons, nor can it be
explained by one unexpectedly hot month or two (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
2008). Rather, the very climate of the earth has changed, is still changing, and will continue to
change. These changes are not “natural” in any traditional sense of the word; they are primarily
caused by the release of carbon dioxide, or CO2, into the atmosphere via human activity. As our
activity continues, the concentration of carbon dioxide in our atmosphere rises, and our effect on
the climate becomes ever worse (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014).
These facts are well-established and rigorously reviewed by physical scientists far more
qualified than myself and they will not be argued here (but see Cook, et al. for an overview of
the world’s scientific consensus). Instead, I will consider the way in which our society has
managed this crisis. In the 21st century, when our lives have been extended by the advances of
modern medicine, and regularly carry around more data in our pockets than was needed to land
men on the moon, we have yet to unify around the scientific method. Some individuals will not
question the theories of scientists as they drive their cars or turn on their microwaves, but will
mock the theories of the Big Bang, evolution, or climate change. These theories explain critical
components of our world, and are held to just as rigorous a standard as any (if not more), yet are
not accepted by much of the American public despite a clear scientific consensus (Cook, et al.,
2016).
Acceptance of the Big Bang and evolution in modern society, though valuable, is
generally not necessary to live a normal life: these theories cover events which are almost
completely historical. The same cannot be said of climate change. The increase in temperature
associated with climate change will dramatically shape how our economy, health and everyday
5

activities function for the remainder of humans’ time on Earth if it is not mitigated. In
democracies such as our own, the layman must know and internalize this fact in order to
campaign on its behalf, support sympathetic politicians, and eventually change policy. Further,
these campaigns must overcome opposing campaigns which inevitably arise in almost any
political arena. We will discuss these opposing campaigns at length and how we can overcome
them. In essence, our campaign must be stronger than its opposition, and for our campaign to be
stronger, there must be many people that know the facts which drive the campaign. I ague that it
is imperative that we have public consensus concerning the existence of climate change.
That is the intent of this paper: to create a public consensus in the United States on
climate change. It will soon become clear that there are people who work to prevent this
consensus; we will refer to their institutions as the climate denial machine. In addition to undoing
the work of the climate denial machine, we will create our own institutions to create productive
conversation about the existence of climate change, and, hopefully, eliminate the influence that
the machine has had.
Our plan will be crafted in the next five chapters, each with its own objective. Each
chapter will build on the previous one. In Chapter 1, we will lay out the essential facts of our
research; that climate change exists, that there is no longer public consensus in the United States
on climate change, and that this consensus is necessary to have policy reform succeed. This
chapter lays the groundwork for this thesis to proceed. We must provide evidence for of the
scientific consensus around climate change and the paradoxical lack of consensus among the
public in order to build an argument about why it is necessary to create a consensus among the
public. In the second chapter, we will explore the individual psychological foundations of
climate denial; this will allow us to understand why people reject the existence of climate change
6

despite the scientific consensus. Mainly, climate denial is linked to anxiety over threats to
capitalism, and is successively worsened through conservative media outlets. The third chapter
will provide evidence of a concerted climate denial machine and examine these institutions. We
will demonstrate how it explicitly uses the psychological variables from Chapter 2 to achieve its
goals and why it does not want people to accept the scientific consensus. Chapter 4 will produce
a general theory and plan to undo climate change denial based on information from both
Chapters 2 and 3, so that we understand which psychological variables to undo and which
climate change institutions need to be disabled. This chapter will suggest in broad strokes
techniques we might employ to challenge the climate denial machine and build consensus around
climate change among the public. Lastly, we will produce a full policy recommendation in
Chapter 5 based on the plan drafted in Chapter 4. We combine the theory of the previous chapter
with specific data on climate denier demographics and other relevant information. This chapter
suggests, for instance, specific individuals and regions of the country to employ our techniques
and lays out a specific plan to implement.
This plan is not meant to rid the United States entirely of climate change denial. There
will be times throughout this work that severe obstacles to undoing denial will arise, and we
must concede that some cannot be overcome completely, at least with any mortal amount of
resources. However, that does mean that our plan is not able to significantly change public
opinion and affect the political process. There have been countless political movements
throughout history that have succeeded without unanimity, and we can (and must) be one of
them. The counterfactual should always be considered as we face doubts over whether we will
succeed; without any attempt, or even a disorganized attempt, policy reform is unlikely to pass
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and our species’ earthly existence is threatened. An imperfect but good plan is a plan worth using
with this mindset. With these goals in mind, we proceed.
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Preface
Before we begin our long investigation into how we change the minds of climate deniers,
we first need to ensure that our own view, that we believe climate change not only exists but is
human-caused and overall negative for the planet, is epistemologically sound and serious enough
to warrant action. This first chapter attempts to do just that, not only by citing research on the
physical science behind climate change phenomena, but also social / political science to examine
the sociopolitical consequences for not enacting reforms within the United States in a timely
manner. Once this is done, we can move to Chapter 2, where we will detail the psychological
mechanisms underlying climate change denial.
Climate Change and its Causes
Human-caused climate change, or anthropocentric climate change (ACC), is real,
extensively researched, and of paramount consequence to humanity. Over 97 percent of actively
publishing climate scientists conclude that human activity has caused mean global temperatures
to rise, showing a clear scientific consensus (Cook, et al., 2016). In addition, the most prominent
American and international scientific associations, academies, and government agencies have
concluded that ACC exists, including the American Chemical Society, American Meteorological
Society, American Physical Society, U.S National Academy of Sciences, U.S. Global Change
Research Program, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (American Association
for the Advancement of Science, 2009). Though changes in climate have occurred through the
history of the Earth, they have been due to natural changes in the planet’s atmosphere, and took
place over tens of millions of years. The Earth has been far hotter than it currently is (or is
projected to be without substantive climate change reform), but the increase for the mean global
temperature over the next 100 years is expected to be more than the increase over the entire
10

Cenozoic Era (~65.5 million BCE – present) (National Park Service, 2010). The Industrial
Revolution spurred a vastly increased amount of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere,
changing its composition far beyond that of natural variations over time, and making it retain
heat for longer periods.1 Evidence shows that the increase of GHGs has increased the mean
surface temperature across the globe, and that the effects of such increases include extreme
droughts, floods, and sea-levels rising (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008).
Though the effects of such climate change will be beneficial for some locations, particularly
those in colder regions where the temperature rising will make living more comfortable, the
overall impact across the globe (and the United States) will be negative. To accommodate for
such changes, very significant investments will be needed to counter the effects, like more
droughts and heat waves, stronger and more intense hurricanes, rising sea levels, and (on
average) noteworthy increases in temperature, leading to changes in agricultural seasons,
precipitation patterns, and the melting of the Arctic Ocean’s ice (U.S. Global Change Research
Program, 2014). An analysis of current trends in GHG emission and the consequences of climate
change predicts that, by the year 2100, if there is no policy reform, the U.S. (in both citizens’
lives and the government’s projects) will spend anywhere from 1.8% to 3.6% of its output on
climate change’s effects (Ackerman & Stanton, 2008). If applied to the current U.S. economy,
we would be spending $3.2 trillion to $6.4 trillion (World Bank, 2016). Perhaps of most
importance is that, due to the relation of GHGs to temperature increases, the longer we allow
GHGs to enter the atmosphere, the more temperatures will rise. This trend is exponential and
increasing. Therefore, in order to most effectively mitigate the effects of ACC, GHG emissions

1

It should be noted that when this report refers to GHG measurements, unless otherwise noted, its measurements are
of the volume of gases per their effect on heat absorption compared to the main GHG, carbon dioxide. These gases
are commonly called “CO2 -equivalent gases”.
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must be sharply decreased as soon as possible (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
2008). Before the Industrial Revolution, GHG concentration in the atmosphere stood at about
280 parts per million (ppm), and is now at about 385 ppm but rising by about 2 ppm/year; the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in its 2007 report that limiting
GHG emissions to 450 ppm in the atmosphere would be enough to keep global temperatures
from rising above 2’ Celsius, but more recent reports conclude that approximately 350 ppm is
necessary (Hansen, et al., 2008). Climate change scientists, policy analysts and social scientists
agree that, in all likelihood, the only feasible means to reduce GHG emissions to these safe levels
is to enact public policies across the industrial world to curb allowances for emissions
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014).
Public Opinion on Climate Change and Policy Reform
Almost any publication on climate change science and the need to enact policy reforms
takes for granted supportive public opinion and the mobilization of issue publics as necessary
(though not sufficient) to significant improvement in emissions in the United States, given it is a
republic and such large reforms are politically expensive to pass without the consent and interest
of one’s constituents (Dryzek, Norgaard, & Schlosberg, 2011). In addition, the U.S. has a unique
role within international relations as a global superpower, one of the leading emitters of GHGs
(second now only to China), and the main facilitator of climate policy treaties among world
powers, most recently the Paris Agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) (The Guardian, 2016; World Resources Institute, 2014). As a means
to influence other governments to lower emissions themselves, the United States benefits from
having the moral high ground of aiming to, and succeeding in, lowering its own emissions, as
countries around the world believe that the highest emitters of GHGs, as well as the richest
12

countries, should be the ones to produce the most reform (Pew Research Center, 2015).
Therefore, maximization of U.S. power to influence GHG emissions rests on whether its
population believes in climate change and is motivated to reduce its impact. The particular
solution(s) chosen to combat climate change will not be discussed or argued for here: merely, for
whatever solution is ultimately chosen, the U.S. must be prepared to enact it by having a
citizenry accepting of policy reform.
Evidence of ACC and the associated policy debates had thoroughly reached the
mainstream population in the early- to mid-2000s. In 2008, belief amongst United States citizens
in global warming stood at around 71%, belief in its being human-caused was at 47%, and belief
about its effects being “very serious” stood at 44% (Pew Research Center, 2009). While not
perfectly representative of the views of scientists, it was clear that citizens were accepting the
consensus and acknowledged the need for action. However, the trend was undermined by a few
events that followed, most notably one colloquially referred to as “Climategate”. In 2009, a
server at the Climate Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia was hacked and
internal emails were leaked onto the internet. Opponents of climate change cited a small
selection of these emails to argue that the organization had conspired to exaggerate results of
their findings and suppress contrary evidence, and the event was widely covered on both British
and American media. Both university and independent investigations were done of the CRU,
however, exonerating them of all charges and rejecting any foul play in their works. Soon after,
the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report was found to have several errors (though some error is far
from uncommon in scientific reports), leading to an independent examination of their review
processes, and again finding no wrongdoing. Studies have since confirmed that trust in climate
science and climate scientists are key factors in public opinion on ACC, and that these incidences

13

(particularly Climategate) negatively affected that trust in about a fifth of the United States
population (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 2012). In 2009, not too
long after the incident, belief in global warming stood at 57%, belief in its being human caused
was 36%, and belief in its being very serious was 35%. Fortunately, there has been a nonnegligible upshift in public opinion since then, though belief in climate change’s impact seems to
be under-addressed. Belief in global temperatures rising now stands at 79%, belief in its being
human caused is 48%, and having “a great deal” of concern for its effects is about 36% (Pew
Research Center, 2016).
Chapter Summary
This chapter aims to detail exactly what climate change is, assert its existence, and
explain why, without proper intervention, it creates serious problems for society at large.
Additionally, it describes the context of public opinion on climate change, and why this is
important to know when crafting solutions. This will lead into later chapters’ analysis of how
public opinion can be shifted, and what resistance we can expect in doing so.
Climate change is caused by the release of heat-absorbing chemical compounds into the
atmosphere. These compounds take a very long time to break down, and their increasing
numbers in the atmosphere additionally increases the heat they take in. The costs of climate
change, if it proceeds unmitigated by policy reform, are severe, including mass floods, droughts,
upticks in viral infections, and more. When the issue of climate change first came into the
general public’s knowledge, it was more or less perceived as a fundamental, nonpartisan concern
for society. However, a series of leaks by hackers, which showed a biased selection of
documents and emails about climate science research, was widely covered by mainstream media
in the developed world and noticeably increased Americans’ distrust of climate science research.
14

Other organizations would later capitalize on this distrust and continue with similarly negative
and skeptical rhetoric. As of 2017, public opinion polls show that trust in climate scientists has
mostly rebounded, but the years between seem to have created an atmosphere of political apathy
towards climate change policy. To avoid the harms of climate change from becoming ever
worse, the political apathy, obstructionism, and elimination of government research must come
to an end. To ensure that this happens, we must organize and alter public opinion to create both
belief in climate change and motivation to reform it.
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Preface
Our first chapter established there is human-caused climate change which will greatly
harm the earth if it is not mitigated, and that swaying public opinion is necessary to introduce
policy reform. Now, we introduce one of the key elements of public opinion: the psychology of
those who do not believe in climate change, and why they do not believe. This chapter will act as
a literature review that we will later refer to in Chapters 4 and 5, where more concrete policy
recommendations will be formed. While the work done here will be essential to our later
conclusions, it should be acknowledged that we will also incorporate an institutional analysis of
climate denial organizations, which will be covered in Chapter 3.
Our explanation of the psychological factors of climate denial will be holistic. We will
examine their demographics so we understand how they relate to society; we will examine what
unique psychological traits they have; we will examine how the issue of climate change became
polarizing among these people; and we will look at the arguments that climate deniers use to
justify their position. This will allow us an insight into who climate deniers are, why they believe
what they believe, what intensifies those beliefs, and what rationales defend those beliefs.
Demographics of Climate Deniers
When we talk about what a climate denier is, we can mean a variety of different things,
all of which have some meaningful usage. We might refer to people who outright reject climate
change, who do not actively believe in climate change, and / or those who reject climate change
to the point of actively working against policy reform. Each of these are legitimate
understandings of climate denial in a functional sense, since none of these groups’ members
would likely promote climate change policy reform. However, we must discern between them
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and identify key characteristics about each group in order to know how to best combat their
reasoning. On a related note, we must investigate whether there are other common
sociodemographic attributes between these groups, not only to allow us to target individuals
properly in our policy recommendation, but to try and understand how one’s status may (if at all)
affect their belief in climate change.
Types of Climate Denial
As stated before, there are a variety of different ways of interpreting climate change,
several of which could justifiably be called climate denial, but we need to define these
interpretations explicitly to easily discuss them and consider how to best approach them.
Fortunately, prior research already exists on the topic. The Yale Program on Climate Change
Communication has, over almost a decade of research, identified six discrete audiences for
climate change communication in the United States. These groups are the Alarmed (actively
worried and taking steps to reduce climate change), Concerned (worried and beginning to take
steps), Cautious (worried but not yet taking steps), Disengaged (not at all interested in the topic),
Doubtful (uncertain of climate change but do not believe it is human-caused if existent), and
Dismissive (actively disbelieves and advocates for anti-environmental policy) (Yale Program on
Climate Change Communication, 2016):
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Each of these categories has a wide array of information available about them, including
their religious habits, their political affiliations, and a variety of other details, like whether they
view climate change as a moral issue. Since the goal of this thesis is to build methods of
persuasion for non-believers in climate change, the Dismissive category is likely to have less
value, but we will examine it for comparative purposes: as we have find later, Dismissives are
polarized to the point that efforts to moderate their perspectives are all but lost. Instead, this work
will focus mostly on persuading the Doubtful, for whom climate change is not viewed seriously
but isn’t actively detested as a concept.
The Dismissive population, in contrast to the other audiences of climate communication,
has a very narrow view of the dimensions of climate change. On average, the Dismissives view it
as only a political issue; only a third or less view it as an environmental, scientific, agricultural,
health, lifestyle, and/or moral topic (Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, 2016).
Further, the Dismissives are (on average) very religious, with about half being evangelicals, 29%
accepting evolution, and 62% believing a literal interpretation of the biblical creation story (Yale
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Program on Climate Change Communication, 2016).2 Caring for the world’s poor (which climate
change will greatly impact) is viewed as important by only 54% of Dismissives, while caring for
future generations stands at 76%. In a similar vein, few Dismissives believe that climate change
reform would help the environment (8%) and future generations (6%) “a lot”. The Dismissives
also tended to have the most individualistic values of all climate change audiences, and their
measurements for low empathy were nearly statistically significant. We will later discuss other
studies which corroborate low empathy among populations of climate deniers which are most
likely Dismissives.
These findings are reflective of many attributes we will come to expect of climate
deniers; their conceptual framing of climate change is very limited, they are quite evangelical,
they tend not to be concerned much with the welfare of those that are not directly relevant to
their own lives, and their values are very individualistic. One interesting note is that, at least
within this study, Dismissers’ measurements for empathy were not statistically significant in
their difference from the other groups, though it is uncertain if they would behave differently
than their peers in other populations if made to empathize with people unlike themselves. Later
studies will test this idea and find different results, so it could be that Yale’s sampling findings
were not representative in this regard, or their measure of empathy varied from other studies.
We will find that the Doubtful population, though it has a much more passive stance
against climate change belief, is quite similar to the Dismissive populations. Doubtfuls hardly
view climate change as a moral, spiritual or religious issue; respondents perceived them that way
8%, 5%, and 6% of the time respectively. Additionally, only ten percent believe their stance on

2

It should be noted here that the belief in evolution in the US population is at 54%, and belief in the literal account
of biblical creation is at 54%.
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climate change reflects their core moral values. Their belief in evolution and biblical creation are
essentially equal to that of the Dissmissives (39% and 62% respectively), and moderately higher
for belief that climate change policy would help the environment and future generations (22%
and 21% respectively). Perhaps the most relevant info is that the Doubtfuls are similarly
individualistic to the Dismissives, and even lower in empathy, scoring the lowest score of any
group (and was statistically significant).
We see a very similar picture when it comes to the attributes for Doubtful and Dismissive
populations, which will make our work both easier and more difficult in certain ways. Both
groups have a very narrow perspective on how climate change affects people’s experiences, are
rather religious (preferring evangelical Christianity in particular), and have lower levels of
empathy than average. Where these groups have qualities are statistically different from the rest
of the American public, they share those qualities, even if one group is more extreme than
another. While it makes these groups easy to identify, and allows us to more easily generalize
findings on climate denial psychology that do not describe individuals as Dismissives / Doubters,
it also means that it will be difficult to distinguish between the two groups when crossreferencing the info we have on them (ex: looking for areas of high religiosity in the U.S.). For
better or worse, when we find groups that are both very religious and highly individualistic in the
United States, we can reliably expect that they will be either Doubtfuls or Deniers (or some mix).
Race and Class
Both those that are skeptical to, or completely deny, climate change tend to be white and
male (Rainie & Funk, 2015). Further, there is a subgroup of this white male population (about
30% of the total) which is well-educated, affluent, and more conservative, for whom climate
skepticism / denial is much more intensified (Slovic, 1999). Part of this may lie in the difference
21

in value systems which appear present among white males compared to other groups. Research
finds that white men place significantly less value on altruism, self-interest and traditionalism in
regards to environmental reform than do all other combinations of sex and race (excluding
Native Americans, who were not tested), with the finders interpreting the results to say “the key
variable associated with environmentalism and altruism may be membership in the most
advantaged social structural or cultural group in the society, rather than race or gender per se”
(Kalof, Dietz, Guagano, & Stern, 2000). The white male subgroup’s intensified climate denial
appears to confirm this theory, since those that are affluent and well-educated are by definition
more socioeconomically advantaged, and showed statistically significant differences within the
same race and sex.
The main conclusion behind these bodies of research, at least as they relate to white men
and climate denial, is that those who are skeptical to climate change are subconsciously
attempting to maintain their group’s status. Those white males who have an individualistic and
hierarchical worldview are inclined to reject the concept of climate change risk because it
threatens their way of life via environmental regulation (McCright & Dunlap, 2011).
Additionally, white conservative males have a much higher tendency towards system
justification as a whole, because “the current industrial capitalist order… has historically served
them well” (McCright & Dunlap, 2011). We will return to this notion shortly when we discuss
high dominance orientation as a psychological characteristic of climate deniers.
Psychological Characteristics of Climate Deniers
When studied in the academic realm, climate change denial is most often investigated
from a psychological perspective. This is because, given the enormous amount of evidence that
anthropocentric climate change exists and the trustworthiness of the institutions from which the
22

evidence comes, there is essentially no rational basis to deny climate change, leading researchers
to instead look for irrational bases. While we will cover belief frameworks in the next section of
this chapter, it should be understood beforehand that the arguments used by climate deniers have,
in all the cases I have personally investigated, used faulty logic and / or have false premises; the
latter has been much more frequent. With that in mind, the core of our studies will be based on
why people would reject the existence of climate change even though there is seemingly no
intellectually honest reason to do so.
Low Empathy
One factor which is essential to understanding climate deniers is their typically low
empathy. In this context, empathy is not synonymous with sympathy. There is no evidence to
suggest that climate deniers lack the ability to care for the pain of others, in a sort of sociopathic
way. Instead, the word “empathy” is literally applied, and means the degree to which an
individual identifies with another individual or group. Low empathy in an individual would mean
that his / her ability to identify with another is minimal, whereas high empathy would mean that
he can greatly identify with others.
When talking about empathy, social psychologists tend to consider not simply whether
one can empathize with others in general, but how his / her empathy ranges across different
individuals, and for what reason. The main trait we will discuss in the context of climate deniers
is low empathy with people of high social distance. Social distance is a term which describes
“the extent to which individuals or groups are removed from or excluded from
participating in one another's lives” (Dictionary.com, 2017). When someone is of high social
distance, they are more excluded from the individual in question; for low social distance, they
are more included. For example, a native-born American citizen would likely have much less
23

social distance from her neighbors than the citizens of Nicaragua, since her neighbors are more
relevant to her everyday life and position in society.
This information culminates in two ways: (1) that low empathy (without regard for social
distance) correlates with the predictor of climate denial known as dominance, which we will
cover shortly, and (2) that low empathy for people of high social distance can make certain proclimate-belief media ineffective at changing the minds of climate deniers. The study detailed
below elaborates on this second point.
Interested in the effects of social distance on climate change communication, researchers
showed subjects articles about individuals being negatively affected by climate change, and
surveyed them before and after on their thoughts to gauge their change in belief. The control
variable was an article about American citizens, while the other articles concerned people in
foreign countries outside of the Americas. When “strong Republican” (i.e. very conservative)
people were shown articles concerning people of high social distance, their interest in mitigation
of ACC dropped noticeably. This effect is common in political communication, and is known as
the “boomerang effect” – when someone expects interference with a variable to cause it to have a
particular effect, but instead, it has the opposite effect. However, when this was done with people
of low social distance, these conservative readers almost entirely resisted the boomerang effect,
and were more informed on the dangers that climate change posed to people (Hart & Nisbet,
2012).
These findings on social distance will allow us to better avoid the boomerang effect in
our own policies, by identifying an instance where it may arise, and how it can be almost entirely
mitigated. This will allow us to inform climate deniers on the circumstances of climate change

24

without further polarizing them into a full rejection of climate science, which, as we will see later
on, is a legitimate concern.
Dominance
Political psychologists have identified a native trait among people which they call “social
dominance orientation” (SDO): a preference for group-based social hierarchies. The higher one’s
inclination towards SDO, the more they dislike when social systems are changed, particularly
when they become less hierarchical. Since policy reform for climate change has the potential to
diminish the wealth of very large industries and force changes in many aspects of people’s lives
via regulation, hierarchies are undoubtedly threatened in some way, even if not to a serious
degree in the average citizen’s personal life. In addition, high SDO also correlates with an
inclination towards dominance over nature (NDO), meaning people are predisposed to think that
humans are above nature and therefore not challenged by its changes (such as climate change)
(Milfont, Richter, Sibley, Wilson, & Fischer, 2013). Conversely, high SDO is predicted by low
empathy (and vice versa), which also could demonstrate a lack of interest in the consequences of
climate change (making denial less meaningful to him/her) if one is in an affluent nation like the
United States that can adapt more easily than others (Sidanius, et al., 2013). A random-sample
survey found the following model to be the most accurate representation of how dominance and
other factors relate to climate change denial via continuous regression modeling (Jylhä &
Akrami, 2016):
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This study, while groundbreaking in its finding of SDO and NDO as primary attributes
for predicting climate change denial, does have some limitations in applicability: (1) its lack of
causality fails to demonstrate which way the relationship between SDO / NDO and denial
operates, and (2) the study’s survey took place in Sweden, meaning its behaviors may not
directly transpose onto American psyches (or other countries, for that matter). However,
considering that these are, above all things, human traits, one might reasonably conclude that
dominance operates similarly in people across the world, but vary in intensity depending on
one’s sociopolitical environment. Therefore, the relationship between SDO/NDO and climate
change denial may be more intense in the United States, considering its tenser relationship with
climate change politics compared to an environmentally friendly country like Sweden.
The largest implications of this regression model come from what other human traits are
associated with SDO / NDO. For instance, a study shortly before the one above found that
women score higher in empathy, lower in SDO, and have stronger environmental
attitudes/behaviors than men do (Milfont & Sibley, 2016). Further, SDO has been shown,
between this study and others, to out-predict climate change denial than such factors as
conservative political orientation, authoritarianism, individualism, distrust of media, and others.
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Perhaps of most importance here, though, is that a study showing a newscast demonstrating
evidence for ACC was able to decrease denial among those with high SDO and/or conservative
political orientation, showing that, even in these populations, reasoning and communication is
still persuasive (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014). It would seem, then, that SDO is likely the best
predictor of climate change denial that we will find, but does not cause people to further distrust
climate change when exposed to counterintuitive information (i.e. polarize them). Variables of
this kind will be examined in the next section.
Political Conservatism
Though conservative ideology correlates positively with SDO, the regression modeling of
the study above found that conservatism was absorbed by SDO as the statistically significant link
to climate denial (Wilson & Sibley, 2013; Jost & Thompson, 2000). However, conservative
ideology does serve some utility in understanding how climate denial can become intensified.
When someone is conservative, regardless of the correlating factors leading to conservatism, it
can lead to increased polarization on climate denial due to a perceived threat of Leftism using
environmentalism as a tool for political power (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). We will see greater
evidence of this in the section on polarization, as well as the section on climate denier arguments.
In general, conservatism has been linked through neuroscience to correlate with increased need
to “to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust”, as well as an enhanced dislike of these
feelings, though current theories contend that it is causally related by the increased size of the
amygdala that also correlates with conservatism (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011; Jost &
Amodio, 2012). Regardless of the source of these traits, the knowledge of heightened anxiety to
uncertainty and threats will become critical to the formation of our anti-climate-denial messages,
as will be discussed later on.
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Religiosity
Lastly, another critical factor is the interaction of religion with the threat of climate
change. We have seen that high religiosity is common among climate deniers, but we have not
yet seen how religion impacts belief in climate change, if it does at all. This is a rather important
consideration, since not only are most climate deniers religious, but so are most Americans. If
there is some essential attribute of religion which makes belief in climate change more difficult,
we ought to know about it so we can understand what obstacles we will have in persuading
climate deniers of varying degrees.
Fortunately, religiosity has not been linked to climate change denial, at least as of yet.
However, belief in the apocalypse because of one’s religion does affect his / her stance on
climate change policy reform, which affects a lot of United States citizens. 41 percent of
Americans believe that the Second Coming will happen by 2050, and 58 percent of white
evangelicals believe this as well (Pew Research Center, 2010). Believing in the End-Times
within a short time frame has been shown to decrease interest in policy reform to fix long-term
solutions (including climate change), even among people which would ordinarily believe these
problems exist, would desire solutions, and are concerned for the welfare of society as a whole.
These findings even adjust for political affiliation and positions of privilege, and find similar
results for other scenarios like high national debt, meaning that they most likely are separate
from the effects of SDO and empathy (Barker & Bearce, 2012). To many believers, climate
change may in fact be taken as a confirmation that the End-Times are approaching, rather than
something is unrelated to the Gospel and is a human problem (Scherer, 2004). The study above
found that 76 percent of Republicans professed belief in the Second Coming (in 2006), though it
is unclear whether or not they believe it will be in their lifetime or not. This suggests a deep
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trouble for our efforts if the problem is made out to be existent only in the long term, when many
believe the End-Times will have already come. These results imply that we ought to emphasize
the already present concerns of climate change, and then make clear that they will only get worse
(in the short run as well) to these more religious audiences.
Polarization of Climate Denial
Climate change has always been slightly more believed by the Left than the Right, even
when the concept was first introduced to the public, but over the years it became much more
polarized, to the point that it is now more polarized than ever before (Dunlap, McCright, &
Yarosh, 2016). Political polarization has risen across all public issues, however. Median
Democrats have moved more to the political Left, and median Republicans have moved more to
the political Right. At present, only 4% of Republicans are more liberal than the average
Democrat, while only 5% of Democrats are more conservative than the average Republican,
down from 23% and 17% respectively in 1994 (Pew Research Center, 2014). Perhaps the most
serious statistics are those of each party’s members’ views of the other party: 11% of Democrats
view the Republican Party favorably (down from 22% in 2009), and 8% of Republicans view the
Democratic Party favorably (down from 30%); the trend does not vary much among left- and
right-leaning independents either, respective to each party (Pew Research Center, 2016). This
poses a critical problem: as each party’s constituents begin to more and more dislike the other
party, and align themselves more with the views of their own party, it can become difficult for
these constituents to break from their party when their positions have an incorrect view of the
facts. This is because of two psychological phenomena: (1) people prefer to receive information
which confirms their previous beliefs, and (2) as people receive more information which
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confirms their beliefs, those beliefs become more polarized, and they identify more with others
that hold those beliefs as well. Below, we will explore how these phenomena were discovered.
Confirmation Bias
Finding information on climate change, or what scientists think about climate change, is
not too difficult if one has access to any online resource. The first results when typing “is climate
change real” into Google are NASA’s site on climate change information, and Wikipedia, which
both explain the scientific consensus and explain why the problem is occurring (Let Me Google
That For You, 2017). Yet, we’ve seen that the country is heavily underinformed on climate
change: not just on whether it exists, but on whether other people think it exists. Only 47 percent
of Republicans, for example, believe that “most scientists believe global warming is occurring”;
the same response occurs for only 65 percent of the American public and 82 percent for
Democrats (Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016). The reason that communications experts give
for this phenomenon is that people choose to, out of enjoyment and an avoidance of cognitive
dissonance, seek information sources which correspond with their worldview (KnoblochWesterwick & Meng, 2009). In other words, people are biased to confirm their pre-existing
viewpoints, succinctly labeled as “confirmation bias”. Confirmation bias is a rather well-known
concept, so I will not dwell on it here, but its connection to political polarization becomes
apparent when introducing the concept of reinforcing spirals.
Reinforcing Spirals
As we have demonstrated before, conservative-minded citizens are more predisposed
towards climate change denial, and that conservatives are predisposed to view conservative
media out of confirmation bias (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). But, it has not yet been
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demonstrated that conservative media use contributes to global warming denial in viewers, nor
that successive viewing continues to polarize denial (or whether the opposite is true for nonconservative media). To test this hypothesis, a study was performed which used a two-wave,
within-subject panel survey of those who watched media that corresponded with their
conservative/non-conservative political alignment. The following was found: (Feldman, Meyers,
Hmielowski, & Leiserowitz, 2014)

Media of a given type, when watched (wave 1), intensified one’s position on climate
change and policy support/dissent, as well as the likelihood of consuming the same media later
on (wave 2), which brought about similar intensification of beliefs to wave 1. The model
continues indefinitely with the same effects so long as waves of in-line media use also continue.
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What this study emphasizes is that media is a powerful tool for creating, particularly
within the confines of climate denial, polarization which is independent of scientific analysis and
evidence. Even aside from an interest of garnering belief in climate change, this demonstrates
that people are apt to be convinced on either side regardless of the merit of the evidence utilized
in the media they use. In the case of conservative media sources, this means that viewers are
inclined to reject climate change, so where possible, we will want to interfere with this cycle of
media consumption / polarization. Chapters 4 and 5 will detail suggested methods of
interference.
Common Rationales of Climate Deniers
Despite the irrational factors we have discussed surrounding climate change denial, the
rejection of climate change is not often discussed as a matter of mental biases in the public.
Usually, it is supported as a rational conclusion by means of a series of arguments. While the
evidence, and the trustworthiness of the institutions providing evidence, are very sound, it is
necessary to consider what would constitute intellectually honest denial of climate change, were
it to exist. Feminist epistemologist Heidi Grasswick builds a strong (if hypothetical and not
holistic) case for climate skepticism:
“… Distrust in climate change science from a position of privilege could be justified and
considered responsible if there were available evidence that the institutions of climate science
are not working well, evidence that they are failing to produce high-quality research relevant to
a group, or evidence that they are reporting results in ways that are manipulated in order to
serve the interests of either the scientists or some other group… at the expense of one’s own
group (Grasswick, 2014).”
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Evidence of the sort that Grasswick brings up has not presented itself, though, as we will
find in the next chapter, there are organizations who attempt to make people believe that it has.
This strategy often works: eight of ten climate deniers believe climate scientists are overstating
evidence for their own interests, and nine of ten believe that the media is overstating it; also of
note is that 47% of those unsure if climate change exists believe climate scientists overstate their
results, and 60% believe the media overstates the problem (Borick & Rabe, 2012). Thus, if we
want to persuade climate deniers, we must not only uncouple climate denial from its
psychological influences, but also invalidate the arguments they believe.
Argument Framing
In our daily lives, when one hopes to counter someone else’s argument, he or she is, by
all conventional understanding, most able to do so by finding a contradiction in that person’s
claim, often by introducing some new piece of information which leads to the contradiction. This
is to disprove the logic used by the opponent in the argument. But, we can each talk and argue
about different aspects of a given issue, particularly when we talk about problems, in different
ways. This is called “argument framing” in academic circles. We can consider whether or not
there is a problem (diagnostic framing), what we should do about the problem (prognostic
framing), and why people should support doing something about the problem (motivational
framing). In order to most directly lead to a contradiction (and therefore counter the argument of
the person we wish to convince), we ought to be arguing the same frame of the problem as our
opponent: in the context of climate change, for instance, if I wished to contradict someone that
was arguing climate change does not need policy reform (prognostic frame), I should offer
reasons why policy reform is necessary in my own argument (also prognostic frame). In addition,
a contradiction generally ought to have the same category of discussion within the argument
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frame: for example, if the climate change policy contrarian said a given reform was unnecessary
because it will have limited impact on the environment’s wellbeing (science category), I ought to
argue that the reform is impactful (also science category) if I wish to convince him or her.
One article wishes to explore whether or not climate believers and climate
skeptics/deniers are using the same argument frames and dominant categories when they talk
about the issue, by examining all relevant US newspaper editorials available on Lexis-Nexis
from September 2007 to September 2009 that included the terms “climate change” and/or
“global warming”. (Hoffman, 2011) They also attended a climate denier conference and recorded
all the speeches that day, again analyzing them for argument frames and dominant categories. 3
The findings showed this was very far from the case: whereas only 60% of “convinced”
editorials used a diagnostic frame, 95% of “skeptical” articles did; similarly, “convinced” articles
used a prognostic frame 80% of the time, whereas “skeptical” articles only used it 40% of the
time (motivational frames were not too dissimilar). Furthermore, dominant categories were also
quite different; skeptics emphasized science (typically in association with a diagnostic frame, to
argue that science rejects that climate change is happening) whereas believers focused on risk
(alongside a prognostic frame, to say that we ought to act because there is risk to not acting).
Interestingly, both groups utilized political ideology as a dominant category, but under different
frames: skeptics associated it with a diagnostic frame, contending that those who espouse climate
change are politically motivated alarmists (as we have covered earlier), whereas believers used a
prognostic frame to suggest interest in political compromise for a substantive reform, such of use
of cap-and-trade policies favored by conservatives. Below is a statistical table from the study
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It should be noted that these editorials and speeches could be listed as using more than one argument frame or
category at a given time, just like a typical argument may use.
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showing more on the argument framing and issue categories of each type of article (Hoffman,
2011):

This suggests we are, as the author puts it, “talking past each other” in regards to climate
change debates. Believers are not typically addressing the arguments made by skeptics (and, by
extension, those made by deniers to create skeptics) and therefore are not able to find
contradictions which may persuade them.
Another telling aspect of the study was the series of arguments made at the observed
climate denial conference. The speakers, 70 of which did not accept the scientific consensus on
climate change and two of which did, contended that the peer review system in scientific
research has become corrupted (calling it “pal review” rather than “peer review”), that belief in
climate change and climate change policy reform were inextricably tied to global socialism and
totalitarianism, and policy reform on carbon emissions would lead to economic depression. The
speeches presented a rejection of climate science as the only means to ensure the continued
freedom of society, with one speaker claiming “the environmental agenda seeks to use the state
to create scarcity as a means to exert their will, and the state’s authority, over your lives”. In
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summary, a rejection of climate change was viewed as “part of a larger culture war against
liberal social and/or economic views” which the speakers (and presumably the audience) saw as
a fundamental threat to their lifestyles.
Though this study was limited in scope by using only newspaper editorials to analyze
people’s arguments on climate change, later studies examined other methods of communication,
like online chat boards, and found similar results (Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Lambert,
2015). Whatever form our strategy against climate denial takes, it must be sure to answer these
diagnostic questions in quick fashion to ensure that skeptics are able to consider, with minimal
bias against the content, the arguments for belief in climate change science and the risks that
come without that belief.
Chapter Summary
In the previous chapter, we have explained why climate change is a concern, what
difficulties currently lie in solving it, and what steps appear necessary to be able to solve it in the
future. The most crucial step is to alter public opinion so the public believes in and cares about
climate change. Considering how massive the scientific consensus on climate change is, and how
serious the dangers are if it is not mitigated as much as possible, denial of climate change’s
existence seems unintuitive at first glance. To best understand how to diminish climate denial, it
is essential to comprehensively examine the literature on the subject, to understand what
variables contribute to climate denial, how it may spread, and why efforts to educate the public
have not been as thoroughly successful as other scientific realizations.
Academic investigation into climate denial has mainly interpreted it as a psychological
phenomenon. This is mainly because it lacks an external justification and tends to exist only in
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those that share a specific series of psychological traits in common, even if those traits may come
about from the influence of the deniers’ environment(s). Climate change denial is largely among
those who are in the most advantaged social or cultural group in society, and within capitalism, it
tends to be those who are white, male, and conservative. These factors, alongside a limited
empathy for people unlike themselves, cause these individuals to have little interest in climate
policy reform, and much interest in protecting the status quo which benefits them. Thus, they are
inclined towards climate change denial subconsciously, seek cognitive consistency, and feel
threatened when their viewpoint is challenged by those who accept climate science. However,
not all people who reject climate change reform have these traits, or even reject climate change
science. Apocalyptic Christians, who believe in the Christian Rapture, for instance, pose a
unique problem in that they may believe climate change and yet be apathetic because of genuine
belief that humanity will be unaffected.
Climate change deniers often argue that there is insufficient scientific evidence of climate
change, or that existing evidence is illegitimate because of flaws or biases in research methods or
peer review. This is almost entirely false, and a variety of meta-analyses of climate research has
corroborated their trustworthiness, yet these beliefs persist among climate deniers.
Unfortunately, available content analyses of pro- and anti- climate change arguments reveal that
mainstream media, climate scientists, and climate spokespeople have largely failed to address
these criticisms directly. Instead they appear to focus primarily on the potential dangers of
climate change when talking to these groups, seemingly taking for granted that the evidence of
these effects will be accepted at face value. Lastly, a proportion of the most polarized climate
deniers tend to isolate their social and political news and conversations into an ‘echo chamber’ of
those who also (fiercely) deny climate change. This population, alongside the aforementioned
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Christian groups, may be too set into beliefs inconsistent with climate policy reform to be
convinced otherwise.
This literature review suggests two significant themes which we can use when we begin
to form solutions: (1) climate denial is largely a subconscious bias to protect one’s own interests,
and (2) climate deniers’ arguments to protect these biases often go unanswered by climate
believers. After Chapter 3 examines the institutions which contribute to the creation of climate
denial, we can consider what mechanisms we can use to undo these biases and arguments in
Chapter 4, and turn our findings into solutions in Chapter 5.

38

2017

Dismantling the Climate Denial
Machine: Theory and Methods
CHAPTER 3: DENIAL MACHINE ORGANIZATIONS
DREW MICKOLAS

39

Preface
As of this writing, Donald Trump is the president of the United States, and has appointed
Scott Pruitt, a proud climate change “contrarian”, to head the Environmental Protection Agency
(Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, 2017). Pruitt, former Oklahoma
attorney general has been an avid opponent to President Obama’s environmental regulations, and
one of the most well-known climate deniers in the country (Davenport & Lipton, 2016). Rex
Tillerson, former CEO of ExxonMobil, has been picked to be the new secretary of State, offering
the fossil fuel industry an unprecedented amount of political contact to the leader of the United
States’ foreign affairs (Nedig, 2016). In addition to appointments, the Trump administration has
currently and historically aimed to dismantle climate science institutions and beliefs. Trump’s
transition team previously requested the names of all Department of Energy staff whom
contributed to climate policy reform, which many pundits predict is a precursor step to fire them
and take away experienced employees from future administrations (Dixon, 2016). This was
followed by a confirmation that the administration plans to cut at least 50% of staff at the EPA
(Siciliano, 2017). Donald Trump himself has insisted that “the concept of global warming was
created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive” (Trump,
2012). Trump has made close to 100 references via Twitter alone to climate change as a hoax
(Trump Twitter Archive, 2016). During the presidential campaign, Trump promised to withdraw
from the United Nations Paris climate agreement entered by President Obama, but the
administration’s members have conflicting views on the matter and no decision has been made at
the time of writing (Davenport, Top Trump Advisers Are Split on Paris Agreement on Climate
Change, 2017). Nonetheless, his choice of Pruitt for head of the EPA, his continued
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unpredictability, and the Republican-controlled Congress does not bode well for the future of
climate change policy in the United States or its international agreements (Diamond, 2016).
Climate change did not appear to be, at least by any conventional metric, a key issue
during the recent election cycle, and certainly not framed as an issue which will affect human
civilization for as long as it lives on the planet. There was not a single question on climate
change during the presidential debates, though Hillary Clinton did mention Trump’s infamous
Chinese conspiracy claim, and made passing comments of her support for climate change
policies (Sheppard, 2016). Polling finds that climate change had below average importance to
constituents of both parties this election cycle (Newport, 2016). Even if not a large talking point
of the Democratic vs. Republican race, the fact that climate change was seemingly not a
significant factor in the minds of citizens, whose welfare will be affected in serious ways by it,
means that climate deniers (including Trump) were politically salient enough to not hurt their
chances of success. This is a problem whose solution requires a deep institutional analysis of
how climate deniers operate and convince laymen that climate change is either not real or not a
great enough cause for concern that it should be on the national debate stage.
Describing Science Denial Movements
Describing the climate denial movement requires also describing what a science denial
movement is. It may be simple to picture a person or group disagreeing with a scientific
viewpoint that we, many others, and maybe even most scientists accept and call that science
denial, but what we will be discussing is much more than mere disagreement. The largest reason
why science denial individuals and groups are a public concern is because they engage in what
has been coined “science abuse”. To effectively discuss science abuse in a nonpartisan and
productive fashion, of course, definitions and examples need to be produced to force
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accountability for the entire political spectrum. To that end, we must start by detailing what
science abuse is. Political commentator Chris Mooney provides a clear definition of science
abuse that can be used for both the political Left and Right. Since the end goal of science abuse
is to distort the scientific method to form denial, science abuse is a means to science denial and
the key tool of the science denier movement. It is defined as “any attempt to inappropriately
undermine, alter, or otherwise interfere with the scientific process, or scientific conclusions, for
political or ideological reasons” (Mooney, 2005). In addition, Mooney names ten distinct
categories of science abuse, listed below: (Mooney, 2005)

#

Category

Definition

1

Undermining science itself

2

Suppression

3

Targeting individual scientists

4

Rigging the process

5

Errors and misrepresentations

6

Distortions

7

Magnifying uncertainty

8

Relying on the fringe

9

Ginning up contrary “science”

Aiming to discredit the scientific method
without argument, like calling evolution
“just a theory”
Stalling or otherwise aiming to prevent
release of scientific findings
Aiming to delegitimize specific researchers
to discredit scientific institutions as a whole
Controlling who is selected to research and
deliver information on a given policy or
research topic
Deliberately misstating facts or “cherrypicking” results
Changing research findings to accommodate
a political view while not considering the
information in its full context
Targeting the scientific method’s concept of
scientific uncertainty and exaggerate it to
imply no meaningful conclusion can be
made at all
“Cherry-picking” not results but the
researchers of those results
Funding/generating studies to produce
“science” favorable to one’s own interests to
create false controversy
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10

Dressing up values in scientific clothing

Post-hoc contending that one’s decisions
were made for a “scientific” reason rather
than some alternate reason based on values

It is equally important to note what science abuse does not include. Notably absent from
the list are actions like: criticizing one’s research methodology, arguing and justifying that a
certain topic or subtopic is under-researched, and noting difficulties in policy implementation
(for topics related to science policy). It is because these are each acceptable under a philosophy
of science; they do not attempt to undermine the process, especially for personal benefit, but
instead point out gaps in knowledge or method that could then be remedied to produce more
effective research. One ought always to remember that skepticism is inherent to the scientific
method, whereas mechanisms for denial are not. Later sections will show the contrast between
these legitimate methods and those of the climate denial machine and similar movements.
Organized efforts to cause disbelief towards scientific findings are not a recent
development, nor an uncommon one, but it is important to closely examine the definition of
science abuse to understand why it is more potent and dangerous than other, similar behaviors.
Scientific skepticism movements can be found essentially anywhere that an unintuitive finding is
made. Even among the Left, and against commercial interests, there have been scientific
skepticism movements. One such movement has been against genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) and their usage in, or as, food, despite the consensus in the scientific community that
they have no adverse effects in humans (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine, 2016). Conversely, it is true that scientists have sometimes overhyped science relating
to issues supported by the American Left, such as the potency of embryonic stem cell research
on curing diseases (Vastag, 2001). It is also without question that American scientists are, on
average, more liberal-leaning than the general population (about 80% identify as Democrats or
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lean Democratic), and this has affected the topics which get researched and the modes of
research in which they are investigated (Pew Research Center, 2009). Harvard University
cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker notes that inquiries into the genetic basis for human
behavior, being highly politicized, have been largely avoided by the Leftist scientific community
which prefers viewpoints of “nurture over nature”, leaving a critical gap in research (Pinker,
2002). But, on the whole (especially where climate change is concerned), organizations which
aim to deny the science of a given topic (1) are associated with one or more industries which
produce greenhouse gases directly, and (2) tend to attack the scientific community not for
abstaining from certain areas research due to their partisanship, or for exaggerating the potential
utility of their studies, but for allegedly tampering with its results of their publications as a means
to some political agenda or personal success (Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008).
Historical Examples of Science Denial Movements
Cigarette Health Risks
One of the most well-acknowledged science denial movements is that over the negative
health effects of cigarette smoking of the 1950s and 1960s. Due to litigation, many internal
memos on the topic have come to light. Culminating around 1964, when the United States
Surgeon General released a report tying smoking to lung cancer, chronic bronchitis, heart
disease, and emphysema, cigarette companies (also called “Big Tobacco”) believed they needed
to counter these statements to protect their profits. (Mooney, 2005) As cigarette company Brown
& Williamson documented about their public relations strategy: “Doubt is our product, since it is
the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general public.
It is also a means of establishing a controversy”. This trend continued into the ‘80s and ‘90s,
when secondhand smoke was identified as a human lung carcinogen by the Environmental
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Protection Agency (EPA) in 1992. The cigarette company Phillip Morris helped to fund a new
group known as the Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC), which marketed itself
as a grassroots-based, independent group of watchdog scientists and experts advocating “sound
science” in American public policy. Phillip Morris documents reveal that they avoided
discussion of their connection to the TASSC in all media inquiries as well. The TASSC went on
to criticize the EPA’s secondhand smoke report as well as the EPA’s work in general, though it
did so amongst a myriad of other environmentally-related denial movements. In 1995, when the
103rd Congress’ Republican members began to form their policy language, Newt Gingrich (then
House Minority Whip) adopted “sound science” and “junk science” as political buzzwords.
“Sound science” quickly spread among Republican senators, as a Knight Ridder article
suggested, to be used as a code word, not for research that matches the scientific method, but
research whose findings support deregulation of a given industry, regardless of its merit. The
affected industries donated heavily to Congress soon after, with Republican senators received
over $1.5 million in campaign funds over the first half of the year, outdoing Democratic Party’s
earnings tenfold and demonstrating the political value of business loyalty. Even to the present
day, Republican Congressmen receive about five times more funds from tobacco lobbying than
do Democrats (OpenSecrets, 2016).
Pesticides and Harms to Nature
Industries have long been searching for a type of pesticide which can allow crops to grow
without being eaten by insects or other life, without having negative impacts on the crops or
environment around them, but due to the difficulty in crafting a poison which kills only
undesirable forms of life, many mass produced forms have failed. The most infamous instance of
this problem arose in the form of a chemical called DDT, which was used regularly in the United
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States until it was shown to likely have carcinogenic effects on humans and was banned in 1972
by the EPA (US Enivronmental Protection Agency, 2016). The World Health Organization now
only permits use of DDT as a preventative measure against malaria in specific African countries.
There was large scientific controversy over DDT at that time, but it was more a clash of
utilitarian calculations than a dispute over the evidence (Conis, 2010). However, there was a
push at the turn of the century, with a variety of right-wing think tanks and PR firms, to test the
public’s interest in another marketing of DDT by denying the relevance of any prior scientific
conclusions on DDT, calling the reports “junk science” and gaining the support of some United
States senators (Swartz, 2007). While the DDT science denial movement seems to have lost
virtually all of its momentum, the mechanisms it used are reflected in other movements of its
kind.
A modern version of pesticides that has replaced DDT, known as neonicotinoids, has
been conclusively found to be a threat to pollinating creatures, cause air and water pollution, and
harm a variety of other kinds of animals (McGrath, 2014). There has been an especially dense
collection of research on the harm to honeybee populations as a result of neonicotinoid use,
including significant damage to their reproductive health and brain structures, though they are
likely not the only contributing factor to their decline (Williams, et al., 2015; Hill, 2015;
Grossman, 2013). Neonicotinoid manufacturers have claimed, in stark contrast to the extensive
literature reviews on the subject, that “there is… no direct correlation between neonicotinoids
use and poor bee health”, but have largely avoided the press on the issue (Kuenzle, 2013). The
trade association firm CropLife America, whose political action committee spends about $2.5
million a year on average, advocates for many of these manufacturers (OpenSecrets, 2016;
CropLife America, 2016). Other agricultural corporations, like Monsanto (also defended by
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CropLife) have bought out bee research organizations and producing reports contrary to the rest
of the available literature (Gustin, 2013). It should be noted that the effects of neonicotinoids do
help to produce more food – it is very difficult to contest that other forms of legal pesticide are
just as effective – but the debate is hardly ever on the value clash between food yield and
environmental impact, and more on a denial of the basic scientific conclusions (Bates, 2015).
Hydraulic Fracturing and Water Quality
Hydraulic fracturing, commonly referred to as fracking, has arisen as a contemporary
means of retrieving oil from the earth by injecting chemicals to break up its layers, connecting it
to the very lucrative fossil fuel industry. Though there have been efforts for companies to be
required to disclose the chemicals used in their fracking projects, many of those companies, like
ExxonMobil, have lobbied to include loopholes to prevent such chemicals from being revealed to
the public. The new bills only allow the chemicals to be shown to state officials and medical
personnel, and making it a Class 1 felony to distribute the information elsewhere (Currier, 2012).
Where they have been revealed, the chemicals have been found to contain hundreds of known
human carcinogens and radioactive ingredients (Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2011).
Both geological research and anecdotal reports strongly corroborate the argument that fracking
contaminates surrounding groundwater with these harmful substances, which then inevitably
enter the drinking water of nearby citizens, causing serious health effects (Vengosh, Jackson,
Warner, Darrah, & Kondash, 2014; Greenpeace, 2016). Though the EPA began its own
investigation into the health effects of fracking in 2010, they were stalled and forced to end the
study when fracking corporations refused their attempts to study their working sites (Banerjee,
2015). Aside from fossil fuel companies contributing to the climate denial movement (to be
explored later), they have also rejected the notion that fracking has any danger to the public, like
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all the other movements here in their marketing prime (Urbina, 2011). Though there is no
definitive evidence on whether there are serious consequences to fracking, this rejection is made
without research to support it, and since fracking corporations have actively resisted research on
the effects of fracking, the industry is responsible for both the suppression and misrepresentation
of science.
Ozone Layer Damage
Our earth has a layer in its stratosphere of a molecule called “ozone”. The ozone layer
protects life from some of the radioactive elements of the sun’s ultraviolet B (UVB) rays that
otherwise contribute to forms of cataracts and skin cancer, adverse effects in plant life, and
destruction of phytoplankton, which are at the bottom of the marine food chain and are therefore
necessary for many other forms of life to exist (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2016).
These UVB rays are now able to more easily pass through the atmosphere due to a hole in the
ozone layer, which is caused by pollutants called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) which react with
the ozone molecules (National Georgraphic, 2015). Though legislation was passed in 1996
banning the use of CFCs in industrialized countries (which produced 90% of them), there was an
enormous movement before its passing which believed CFCs were of no harm and that theories
that they could hurt the environment were ridiculous. DuPont, the inventor of CFCs, advertised
in 1975 that “should reputable evidence show that some fluorocarbons cause a health hazard
through depletion of the ozone layer, we are prepared to stop production of the offending
compounds.”. However, after evidence had been found and widely accepted, DuPont noted the
evidence was “a science fiction tale… a load of rubbish… utter nonsense”; representatives of the
company went on to attempt to delay policy to limit CFCs by testifying in Congress, noting “we
believe there is no immediate crisis that demands unilateral action [on CFCs]” (Greenpeace,
48

1997). Despite the scientific consensus of the time, DuPont and other companies continued to
deny evidence concerning the ozone layer until it was clear that a prohibition would be passed in
its markets, at which time they divested from the CFC industry and made a large profit doing so.
Describing the Climate Denial Movement
Science denial, though it applies to many different topics, stays largely the same when
used by a given commercial industry. The methods and incentives of climate change deniers are
not much different from science deniers already mentioned. Below I detail why interest groups
are committed to preventing climate change reform, how they allocate their resources to prevent
reform, and what institutions and techniques they use to discredit climate science.
Interest Groups and Climate Denial
Like these other interest groups and their resistances to reform, a myriad of interest
groups in the United States, and indeed, around the world, have stake in the sorts of policies (or
lack thereof) that are made to reform anthropogenic climate change. Exhaustive analysis of each
of these denial organizations shows that they are each connected to a small selection of
conservative think tanks, by the reports of scientists which specialize in different areas, funded
by the very areas they review (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). At present, greenhouse gas emissions
are heavily tied to economic output, so the larger an economy is, one can expect more economic
power to be involved in producing GHG emissions: the top ten GHG-emitting countries produce
70% of GHGs annually, and of those ten, eight have an above-average GHG-per-capita ratio
(World Resources Institute, 2014). Therefore, those economies which produce the most GHGs
tend to also have very strong investments in the sectors which produce them, and would endure
more pressure for change (and potential loss of profit) if policy is passed. The industrial sectors
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in the United States which produce the most GHGs include, in order of their total emissions,
electricity production (two-thirds of which come from fossil fuels), transportation (via burning
fossil fuels, over 90 percent of which is petroleum-based), industry (the majority of which is
from fossil fuel burning, though chemical reactions to produce goods is also significant),
commercial and residential (fossil fuels used for heating, and waste disposal), and agriculture
(mainly from livestock emissions) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2016). Though
policy reforms to be more GHG-efficient would (at least somewhat) interfere with the short-term
economic goals of each of these sectors, it is clear that the fossil fuel industry, since it is directly
tied to the GHG production in the majority of these fields, has the most at stake, likely losing a
great share of its market if reforms require alternate fuel sources. As a result, the fossil fuel
industry spends hundreds of millions towards climate denial groups (Brulle, 2013).The fossil fuel
industry also spends the fifth-highest amount on U.S. lobbying of any industry in 2016, investing
$88,939,177 (OpenSecrets, 2016), and sixth-highest overall since records became mandated in
1998, investing $1,875,519,592 (OpenSecrets, 2016). Also of interest is that the electric utilities
industry, though indirectly tied to GHG emissions via fossil fuel use, was third-highest in
lobbying spending overall, spending $2,155,275,427 (OpenSecrets, 2016). This demonstrates
that both American fossil fuel companies and their business partners are willing to spend large
amounts of money to lobby to influence government policies.
Though it is clear that these groups lobby, observing their lobbying trends and how they
have changed over time will strength the argument that the industries are interested in promoting
climate denial. Though these groups lobby both sides of the political aisle, within Congress, it is
clear that the Republican Party is granted the most funding, receiving roughly double that of
Democrats since 2012 from the electric utilities industry, and about eight times that of
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Democrats from the fossil fuel industry (OpenSecrets, 2016; OpenSecrets, 2016). Interestingly,
these groups’ funding discrepancies all sharpened around 1996-2000, when climate change
became a more pressing issue for the voting public. Even if it is far from the financial
powerhouse that the fossil fuel industry is, the same trend (but even more exaggerated) can be
found for lobbyists with similarly vulnerable priorities, the mining sector (OpenSecrets, 2016):

Electric Utilities Lobbying by Party
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(OpenSecrets, 2016)
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Fossil Fuel Lobbying by Party
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Mining Lobbying by Party
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Right before this funding change, there was a sharp change in how Congress voted on the
environment, with Democrats beginning to vote much more pro-environment and Republicans
beginning to vote more anti-environment. The League of Conservation Voters compared their
scores of Congressmen across the House and Senate (divided by political party) since 1970,
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showing this trend rather clearly. It should be noted that lobbying records have only been
publicly available since 1990, but considering how pronounced the changes are in that time span,
the correlation should not be ignored (Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016):

Though the Republican Party is, by ideological principle, more friendly to corporations
than the Democratic party, this drastic change in priorities and lobbying over time might also
suggest the possibility of quid pro quo agreements forming, or that they have already formed,
between Republican senators and GHG industries. Many political dangers appear possible if
Republicans do not acknowledge the power of their funding base: if a given Republican senator
was to break from the rest of the party and simultaneously accept climate change science and the
need for significant policy reform, they may lose much of their current earnings necessary for re53

election, and possibly lose fellowship with their fellow Republicans. Therefore, to keep this
financial and political support, these senators have a strong and sustainable incentive to align
themselves with corporate interests, regardless of their private positions.
Climate Denial Machine Organizations
Significant parallels exist between the historical science denial campaigns and their
connections to industry that can be observed today in the climate denial machine. Similar to Big
Tobacco’s use of the TASSC and the DDT producers’ media push, the climate denial machine
utilizes a select group of fringe scientists, policy experts and seemingly legitimate members of
the press to alter public opinion, and financially invests in them using many of the same
techniques. Among these key players are conservative think tanks, front groups for the fossil fuel
industry, conservative politicians funded by GHG-relevant industries, and conservative media
outlets.
These groups provide “complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in the effort to
promote denial of the significance and reality of climate change – especially via the strategy of
questioning the scientific evidence for global warming” (Elasser & Dunlap, 2013). Essential to
climate denial machine’s arguments is that climate scientists are “alarmists” who exaggerate
their claims and the consequences that come from them as a means of getting political and
scientific clout. However, empirical analysis of climate science reports found that climate
scientists actually tend to understate their claims, possibly to minimize backlash from the
inevitable climate denial machine’s response (Freudenburg & Muselli, 2010). However, the
climate denial machine’s audience appears open to the message of exaggeration regardless, and
as the political psychology section of this text will show, it is highly potent among those
predisposed to climate skepticism.
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The nation’s conservative media plays an especially potent role in the climate denial
machine, as a means of delivering a message in a way not only consistent with that of its other
“arms” of communication, but also by tying denial/skepticism (or apathy at minimum) of climate
change to conservative ideology and reinforcing belief via successive use of such media
(Feldman, Meyers, Hmielowski, & Leiserowitz, 2014). In other words, climate denial has been
heavily tied to conservative identity politics, making someone who is classically conservative
feel psychologically obligated to reject climate science for the continuity of their ideology. Later
chapters will expand more on this topic, but it is important to consider when predicting the
impacts of these organizations. For now, we ought to consider how this psychological
phenomenon was able to spread and maintain itself across the country.
First, conservative think tanks received a massive influx of funding, notably by industry
groups related to GHG emissions, starting in the 1980s and 1990s when two key events occurred:
(1) the Reagan administration sharply decreased funding for policy research organizations like
think tanks, and (2) private foundations and corporations vastly increased their contributions to
conservative think tanks, allowing them to outnumber liberal think tanks two-to-one and
outspend them three-to-one (Rich, 2004). Similar to the discussion of Gingrich Republicans and
the rise of the “sound science” industry ties, conservative think tanks used this investment to
massively expand their infrastructure and maximize their influence over United States public
policy. However, this came at the expense of being obligated to advance the climate denial
movement or risk loss of funding, especially because the government could no longer provide
them with a “safety net” of cash; being some of the largest markets available on Earth, the
electric utilities and fossil fuel sectors could provide more than almost anyone. As a result, about
90% of climate denial books published through a company (less so for self-publishers) have a

55

connection to a conservative think tank (Dunlap & Jacques, Climate Change Denial Books and
Conservative Think Tanks: Exploring the Connection, 2013). In conjunction with fossil fuel
companies, these organizations would create large national associations as front groups for their
biased reports, with many of the agents having directly worked in other science denial campaigns
like those of the TASSC for tobacco use (Dunlap & McCright, Climate change denial: sources,
actors and strategies, 2010).
Second, the rise of partisan media in the late 1980s to early- and mid-1990s, during
which conservative outlets like Fox News and the Rush Limbaugh radio program were
established, allowing a medium through which conservative ideology could be broadcast on a
very routine basis (McCarthy & Farhi, 2011; Rush Limbaugh Show, 2013). These networks and
programs have enormous ratings, and often demonstrate a misleading, if not explicitly anticlimate change message on science, despite the scientific consensus, though Fox News has
shown minor improvement in accuracy in recent years (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2014).
Limbaugh in particular has been a critical proponent of climate science conspiracy theories,
claiming that science organizations and even universities are part of a liberal conspiracy for
indoctrination towards global socialism, and often uses isolated weather occurrences (or lack
thereof) to denote the state of the climate as a whole (Rush Limbaugh Show, 2016). Similarly
polarized conservative media outlets have arisen in the age of the internet, with self-proclaimed
“alt-right” organizations like Breitbart News and InfoWars regularly publishing conspiracy
theories about climate change being a hoax, and climate scientists participating in a
conglomerate to deceive the public for their own ends (The Weather Channel, 2016; Daniels,
2015). Fake news sites, particularly on social media pages, have also contributed to
misinformation campaigns on climate, and evidence suggests that not only are people very
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ineffective at identifying fake news articles (Domonoske, 2016), but those with conservative
ideologies might be even more vulnerable due to a need for cognitive consistency (Ingraham,
2016), and preliminary analyses suggest fake news is roughly twice as popular among
conservative social media sources than liberal social media sources (Silverman, Strapagiel,
Shaban, Hall, & Singer-Vine, 2016).
Each of these factors further intensifies the psychological connection of conservativism
with climate change denial, among a group whose need for cognitive consistency is already
higher than the average. As a result of the vast collection of allies and media connections of the
climate denial machine (particularly given their coverage relative to the level of scientists
skeptical of ACC), for those that are already psychologically predisposed towards climate
skepticism, it seems it will be difficult to convince them without directly tackling the approaches
of these organizations.
Climate Denial Machine Tactics
During Ronald Reagan’s administration, there was the first large attempt to undo
environmental regulations in the United States, which was met with severe backlash from liberal
groups, whom were able to capitalize on the scientific consensus around environmental risks and
hazards that these regulations protected against. Conservative think tanks learned from this
lesson and began to question the merit of the science itself, instead of whether or not it is most
beneficial to keep the regulations for other reasons (Dunlap & McCright, Climate change denial:
sources, actors and strategies, 2010).
Below is a representation of the science policy process compared to the process when it is
interfered with by science denial. The left-hand side indicates what would ideally happen if
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science could not be interfered with by outside political forces; it would review information and
provide recommendations, at which point the government and public would seriously consider
them and act accordingly. The right-hand side details what science denial organizations aim to
do: when they dislike the policies outlined in recommendations by expert scientists, they obscure
the significance of the science behind the recommendations, no matter their merit, and continue
to do so as long as it is effective for them (Mashey, 2010):

The intention of climate deniers who are connected to industry is to prevent the last step:
policy and action on relevant issues. By interfering with the step which enters the public sphere,
it can perpetuate the research indefinitely by raising doubts where non-experts do not know
better. Aside from producing media which supports climate denial, they attempt to introduce as
many “experts” as possible as contrarians to divide the existing consensus. Because these
individuals are not truly experts but are meant to appear as such, climate denier organizations
judge and prioritize their use by their expertise and relevance to the field of climatology, so that
the public will view their work as favorably as possible against those of the consensus. The kind
of person they wish to use will vary depending on whom they wish the information to reach; the
graphic below describes the background that a climate denier voice ought to have to be salient
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for a given channel, and which backgrounds are perceived as more credible than others (Mashey,
2010):

This representation should not be surprising among a science denier movement; we have
seen this before in EPA reports and with groups like the TASSC, and two more infamous events
are mentioned below.
Climate deniers capitalize on almost any sense of doubt or room for scrutiny available
among climate scientists in order to discredit climate science as a whole, most notably one event
colloquially referred to as “Climategate”. In 2009, a server at the Climate Research Unit (CRU)
at the University of East Anglia was hacked and internal emails were leaked onto the internet.
Opponents of climate change cited a small selection of these emails to argue that the
organization had conspired to exaggerate results of their findings and suppress contrary
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evidence, and the event was widely covered on both British and American media (Leiserowitz,
Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 2012). Both university and independent
investigations were done of the CRU, however, exonerating them of all charges and rejecting any
evidence of foul play. Soon after, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 4th
Assessment Report was found to have several errors (though some error is far from uncommon
in scientific reports), leading to an independent examination of their review processes, and again
finding no wrongdoing, though this too was very widely publicized. Studies have since
confirmed that trust in climate science and climate scientists are key factors in public opinion on
ACC, and that these incidences (particularly Climategate) negatively affected that trust in about a
fifth of the United States population (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson,
2012). Even during the ongoing investigation, the American Enterprise Institute (largely funded
by ExxonMobil) sent out letters to scientists offering $10,000 each for their services to undercut
the results of the IPCC’s conclusions (Sample, 2007). Criticism of the scientific community as a
whole has also been an essential tool to defend the seemingly outlandish nature of rejecting
climate change in the current day; fewer journals are accepting the work of conservative think
tank scholars who produce climate denial work, forcing them to go to non-scientific outlets and
not hold themselves to peer review, so these individuals claim that scientific organizations (even
the US National Academy of Sciences) are compromised by liberals and an environmentalist
agenda (Michaels & Balling, 2000; Lindzen, 2008). There is little denying that these climate
denier organizations have committed acts of science abuse; the sole event of Climategate
amounts to an incredible targeting of individual scientists to discredit all study, let alone all the
subsequent misrepresentations of information on media outlets, the magnification of uncertainty
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among those who argue for more research despite wide consensus and ever-mounting evidence,
and the host of fringe climate denier publications.
One other critical understanding of how delaying ACC policy reform is realized is by
associating climate policies with a change in the dominant social paradigm. As will be explored
much more later, those most susceptible to climate change denial strategies are typically the most
socially advantaged groups in society; in the United States, this is undoubtedly non-poor, white
males (Slovic, 1999). The more conservative and educated these individuals are, the more
climate denial seems to be intensified in these populations, and research suggests that the main
factor pushing these extreme beliefs is that they are subconsciously motivated to maintain the
status quo which benefits them; the more benefitted they are, the more likely and more intensely
they will be disposed to climate change denial (Kalof, Dietz, Guagano, & Stern, 2000; Jylhä &
Akrami, 2016). Considering the current social paradigm is one predominantly run by capitalist
institutions, this seems to justify why attacks are consistently made by conspiracy theorists to
make out ACC reform as a movement towards global socialism and the end of American
prosperity (Rush Limbaugh Show, 2016; Hoffman, 2011).
American mainstream media’s attempt at nonpartisan balance has incidentally helped
climate change denial/neoskepticism come across as legitimate, often displaying climate denial
machine information sources as comparable to the consensus on climate change by posing
debates as one-on-one standoffs, especially in TV debate forums (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004;
Dunlap & McCright, Climate change denial: sources, actors and strategies, 2010). In other
words, though the science is “in”, so to speak, the media presents the two perspectives equally,
as if there is not truly consensus for what science has to say. Such approaches are found to
increase uncertainty among viewers and lead them towards political inaction (McCright &
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Dunlap, 2003; Boykoff & Roberts, Media coverage of climate change: current trends, strengths,
weaknesses, 2007). Referring back to Mann’s six stages of denial, all that a climate denier must
do on a media outlet to encourage skepticism to the science is show distrust in any of the six
stages. With neoskepticism mostly at play now, the conversation tends to begin around steps 3 or
4, but nevertheless leaves much room for escape from policy reform without prior preparation
(Mann, 2013):
1. CO2 is not actually increasing.
2. Even if it is, the increase has no impact on the climate since there is no convincing evidence
of warming.
3. Even if there is warming, it is due to natural causes.
4. Even if the warming cannot be explained by natural causes, the human impact is small, and
the impact of continued greenhouse gas emissions will be minor.
5. Even if the current and future projected human effects on Earth's climate are not negligible,
the changes are generally going to be good for us.
6. Whether or not the changes are going to be good for us, humans are very adept at adapting to
changes; besides, it’s too late to do anything about it, and/or a technological fix is bound to
come along when we really need it.
Sadly, there is also an exploitable imbalance in how different media forms affect
someone’s concern about climate change and its policy reform; climate change films and articles
about climate change both tend to decrease environmentalist concern if from a denier
perspective, but if from an affirming perspective, do not conversely raise environmental concern
(Greitemeyer, 2013; Hart & Nisbet, 2012). Thus, attempts at equalizing the content of a given
medium between climate change affirmation and denial appears to, on average, cause more
skepticism rather than create balance between the two options.
There is a newer but very concerning tool for interest groups to use when attempting to
change the perceptions of citizens, which is targeted advertisements built on social media and
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television analytics. Business firms associated with these different media outlets can, in
conjunction with voting records and product purchases, find out who is most open to a political
message, usually for the prospect of a vote. Such analytical firms were used during the recent
presidential campaigns and during Chris Christie’s reelection run (O'Connor, 2014) and can
target either specific TV shows (and there are significant correlations with ideology for certain
ones), or even within TV audiences, target specific viewers. The same is true of Facebook’s
“sponsored content”, and Facebook’s political sales department will even help to compile
audiences which match your ideal demographics (Detrow, 2015). Personality quizzes, a very
popular medium on platforms like Facebook, are also used by political groups to narrow down
what sorts of beliefs people are likely to have or would have if given proper media focus; as will
be demonstrated later on, this is a particularly lucrative area for climate deniers, because many
people are highly predisposed towards denial through certain, easily-tested psychological traits
(Funk, 2016). Recently, Facebook revised its terms of service to note that fake news is banned on
its site, and Google has taken steps to prevent fake news sites from using its AdSense network
(Reuters, 2016), but without any known metric by which news will be judged to be real or fake,
it remains questionable whether this standard would or will be held to news articles which
project climate denial stories; both InfoWars and Breitbart News, mentioned earlier as proud
displayers of this belief, still have active profiles on Facebook. This becomes even more difficult
to compensate for, since Facebook is well known to have divisions in what type of content
people see due to its algorithm (Vongkiatkajorn, 2016).With this in mind, the world of climate
denial, or at least political motivation on behalf of climate denial, seems to have a much smarter
tool with which to work; using statistical analysis of the well-known demographics to lead one to
climate denial, certain falsehoods or misrepresentations of truth can be shown to viewers in order
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to change their stances. Though there does not appear to be any research on climate denial being
used by such mediums other than the persistence of these false news sites and false narratives on
social media as a whole, it ought to be watched careful since it is a potentially dangerous tool.
Due to the ever-increasing definitive nature of climate science and the public generally
accepting that some form of climate change exists, it has been difficult for climate denial
institutions to maintain the basic, flat denial that it has in the past with the press and general
public, though it persists among those who peruse highly polarized media sites. In response,
climate “neoskepticism” has risen as a new countermeasure against ACC reform implementation
(Stern, Perkins, Sparks, & Knox, 2016). Climate neoskepticism is denial, one step removed:
neoskeptics contend that climate change exists, and that it may even be anthropogenic (though
this point varies), but is not worthy of policy reform, and may even be beneficial to humanity.
Since this denies the results associated with climate science, it merely removes one aspect of
climate denial to make the underlying arguments appear more legitimate (U.S. Global Change
Research Program, 2014). This transition has been seen before among other science denial
movements, such as that of DuPont’s public relations with CFCs, as a means of delaying policy
implementation for as long as possible for further profit. Greenpeace’s analysis of climate denial
organizations shows that they have indeed been decreasingly arguing against the scientific
consensus that ACC is happening and increasingly focusing on how serious the effects will be
(Greenpeace, 2015). Though this may frustrate individuals who became comfortable with
fighting flat denial among climate deniers, the analogue with DuPont may give us reason for
positivity: this transition could be interpreted as a gradual push forward in the Deny, Delay,
Divest theory.
Chapter Summary
64

In the previous chapter, we outlined what psychological factors contribute to denial and
why it has been so difficult to reverse. However, climate denial has varied from other rejections
of scientific findings in modern history, in that it is very widespread, goes against an incredibly
strong consensus (and media movement to argue in its favor), and brings a serious risk due to
people’s lack of belief. This can be widely explained by an effort within various industries to
create an air of obscurity and distrust around climate research and climate researchers. This
chapter has been dedicated to examining how industries organize to obscure scientific findings,
why they do so, what evidence there is that this happened for climate change science, and what
methods industries have used to obscure the science.
“Science abuse” is a term which varies from typical rejection of science by the layman: it
is a systematic approach to damage the scientific method by unfairly making a piece of research,
a researcher, or scientific research as a whole appear intellectually compromised. Science denial
movements have used science abuse in order to effectively delegitimize a scientific finding. This
makes it easier for individuals to deny the findings regardless of the research’s merit, likely
creating a section of people who, by the processes described in Chapter 1, will find the research
unappealing and subconsciously leads to denial. Various industries have used these techniques
throughout United States history; tobacco, fracking, pesticides, and more. However, these results
have (at least in these examples) lasted for a finite period of time; as a result, these industries
have configured their science abuse strategies to first flatly deny, then attempt to obscure the
legitimacy of research to delay reform as long as possible, and then finally divest from that
market before its value is compromised. This pattern will be colloquially called “deny  delay
 divest”.
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The movement associated with climate change denial (which we will call the “climate
denial machine”) compares neatly with the science denial movements that came before it, and
even includes many of the same members, buzzwords, and strategies, though these institutions
have tweaked and updated their methods over their decades of operation. The climate denial
machine understands that for those holding free-market individualistic beliefs (i.e. most
American conservatives), climate change is a phenomenon that they cannot easily solve under
their worldview, and they use the psychological phenomena identified in Chapter 1 to their
advantage when attempting to create denial. Additionally, the conservative mind is unique in
how it reacts to media, in that it tends to be much more emotionally reactive, creating greater
potential for subconscious suggestion where cognitive dissonance exists in these individuals.
Perhaps most important, the climate denial machine capitalizes on the media’s pursuit of fairness
and free expression to manipulate people’s impressions away from legitimate scientific findings,
by ensuring that climate denial is perceived by the public as similarly legitimate to climate
science. To hide its corporate ties, the climate denial machine conceals its financial and social
underpinnings by using “front” associations which operate as public relations firms on its behalf.
All of these factors combine to make it very difficult for the layman, especially one who is
predisposed to find climate change cognitively dissonant, to identify the climate denial machine
as an agent of science abuse, and therefore not a source to be trusted with such a grave matter.
If there is any hope in convincing the conservative layman of the dangers of climate
change before the damage is too significant to mostly reverse, it must be done by taking away
these vital tools from the climate denial machine as soon as possible. The next chapter builds
upon the literature on climate denial psychology from Chapter 2 and the institutional context of
this chapter to create a means of undoing the psychological variables that the climate denial
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machine relies on. After this, it will be fleshed out into a holistic policy recommendation in
Chapter 5.
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Preface
Thus far, we have covered the concerns of climate change, the psychological mechanisms
which have contributed (and continue to contribute) to the rise and persistence of climate change
denial, and the institutions which capitalize on the policy impacts of climate change denial. Now,
we begin to consider a potential strategy for how to counteract these psychological mechanisms
and forces, so that in our final chapter some policy recommendations can be made to reduce
climate denial with this information. For the most part, we have seen that the psychological
mechanisms underlying climate change denial are due to a perceived threat to the individual;
belief in climate change could challenge their identity, their sociopolitical status, their moral
philosophies, and so on. We have also found that low empathy towards people of high social
distance is a key variable concerning climate change denial, and that people with high empathy
for these persons are (on average) more likely to believe in climate change and support climate
change policy reform. Perhaps most importantly, we have discussed the common arguments and
justifications that people have made concerning why they believe climate change does not exist,
and how these allow climate change denial to persist. So, if possible, we ought to decrease the
perception of threats to these individuals, increase their empathy for people affected by climate
change, and debunk their arguments in a way that does not further polarize their mindsets on the
issue.
This chapter will suggest strategies on each of these fronts. First, we will begin by
proposing free-market policy reforms for climate change, so that climate science is not viewed as
anti-capitalist and so people see it as a benefit to the economy, themselves, and the people they
care about. Next, we use the anti-authoritarian anxieties of conservatives, combined with our
analysis of the climate denial machine, to point out science abuse and show clear evidence of
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who is manipulating evidence and rhetoric to benefit themselves. Then, we discuss how to talk
about climate change in media so that we properly and directly address the beliefs of current
climate deniers, while also defusing common counterarguments before they arise. Finally, we
establish parameters for selecting climate-believing conservative spokespeople to help us spread
our message. Combined, these factors should allow us to (1) allow climate policy reform to be
perceived as a non-threat and a benefit, (2) disable common talking points of climate deniers, (3)
make people distrust climate deniers more than climate scientists, and (4) expand the dialogue
among conservatives about the reality of climate change and the need to solve it.
Reversing Psychological Inclinations Toward Climate Denial
In a certain sense, it is rational from the perspective of a climate denier to reject the
scientific consensus on climate change. This is not because the consensus is false, or that the
denying person will directly benefit from disbelieving it, but instead because the denier sees the
existence of climate change and the need to stop it as a fundamental threat to their way of life.
They mitigate this potential dissonance by “removing” the problem. This motivation for denial is
more successful when the denier does not see people he/she identifies with beginning to suffer
from the effects of climate change. We have seen a host of evidence of this phenomenon as well
as a variety of ways that the climate denial machine makes it worse.
Climate change policy reform does not need to dramatically reshape the structure of
society, of course, so this view held by climate deniers is false. Our job is to deconstruct this
misunderstanding, but it is not as simple as merely telling climate deniers that their perspective is
wrong (though that will be included later in this chapter). Our actions and words towards climate
deniers must be formed with an awareness of the perspective these people have in order to
influence them. To that end, we will work to change climate deniers’ psyches in two ways: (1)
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reduce the perception that climate change reform is harmful to their way of life, and (2) make
climate change more worthy of concern by making its primary victims more easily relatable to
the deniers.
Perceptions of Threats
Climate change is not easily solved by free-market means; as we have seen in Chapter 3,
the industries most closely associated with climate change have strongly resisted regulation,
research, and even public belief concerning climate change. However, in Chapter 2 we found
that most climate deniers strongly justify our predominantly free-market society, lending to the
belief that it can solve any public problem through the self-interested transactions of individuals.
This creates cognitive dissonance when these individuals see that climate change is affecting
society but is not being dealt with, and evidence suggests these people are then inclined to
disbelieve climate change exists to remove the dissonance’s discomforting effects. The empirical
cases we examined in Chapter 2 corroborate this theory. Our analyses of climate denier
conventions and articles, alongside public polling, found that those who reject the existence of
climate change believe that climate scientists overstate their conclusions because of partisan bias.
This allows the climate deniers to continue to have faith in their free-market philosophies by
rejecting the existence of a problem it is not equipped to deal with.
Climate deniers are correct to think that climate change reform would require some
action by the government. However, climate change policy does not need to be considered an
enemy to capitalism (or capitalists) and can instead be conceived as a pro-economy, pro-United
States policy solution. To change this perception, we need to both challenge the anti-capitalist
rhetoric of the climate denial machine and communicate our own nonpartisan approach to
solving climate change.
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This task is simpler than it may first appear, because we can emphasize the growth of
certain parts of the economy via alternative energies rather than the limitation of fossil fuels via
regulation; this allows us to continue to reduce fossil fuel emissions via multiple policies, instead
of prioritizing less popular ones. The alternative energy sector has significantly increased in its
market shares and job quantities over recent years, becoming a much larger (and quickly
growing) force in our economy (WorldWatch Institute, 2016) . As a result, the limitation of fossil
fuels and the increased subsidization of alternative fuels are increasingly becoming desirable for
the economy even when not considering the implications of climate change. Framing segments
of climate change reform as a sort of robust economic subsidy can be viewed as an update to
aging American resources as well as a job creator. An analogous policy platform was seen across
both parties during the 2016 presidential election in the form of infrastructure spending – few
objections were made, and it was considered a way to increase full-time employment across the
country, which was a very popular idea (Fitzsimmons, 2016). This angle aims to make climate
change policy both relevant and positive to the average climate denier; whether or not they
personally are unemployed, the notion that their area could be soon populated with new, goodpaying jobs is a salient one, if opinion polling is to be believed (Auter, 2016).
It may also be wise to tie environmental energy subsidies to other conservative proeconomy, pro-United States movements, like energy independence and international relations. It
could be (and has been) argued that moving towards creating most of our energy from natural,
sustainable resources like air and solar power would be ideal to prevent us from becoming overly
reliant on other nations, thereby limiting the amount of control they have over our actions
(Kaenel, 2016). This perspective is not meant to be interpreted as pro-capitalist but instead antiglobalist; we have seen a deep concern that the concept of climate change is meant to create a
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unified, authoritarian world government, or at the very least expand international laws to be more
restrictive on the rights of individuals. Suggesting that climate change policies could open the
potential for more isolationist policies (even if these policies are never created) may help to
diminish these worries of climate deniers. On a related note, China has recently risen in
international power since the United States has begun to roll back its climate policies under the
Trump administration, allowing it a platform to be perceived as a world leader. Conservatives
typically show serious concern over the influence of China, so we may be able to capitalize on
these worries in establishing a pro-climate change platform (Wike, 2017).
Environmental regulations in particular are unpopular among conservatives and climate
deniers, but they will almost inevitably have to be used in order to sufficiently decrease our
production of greenhouse gases. This is likely where the most significant problems of our
platform will appear; regulations are a well-known conservative talking point, and are typically
discussed by conservative outlets as a means for the Left to restrict the rights of individuals,
while also harming the economy (though whether these effects are viewed as Leftists’ goals or
are merely side effects will often vary). If regulations must be used, and it seems that they must,
we must ensure that they are perceived as positively as possible amid the backlash they will
almost inevitably encounter.
Political commentary aside, climate change regulations have likely not been a threat to
economic growth; most states in the country have successfully decoupled economic growth from
growth in greenhouse gas production (Saha & Muro, 2016). Properly regulating industries
associated with the release of greenhouse gases requires training that creates full-time positions
for employees, while also serving the interests of the United States by mitigating the effects of
climate change. That being said, the benefits of audits and bureaucracy are not likely to be a
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well-received subject among conservatives, even if the private sector is hiring its own auditors
(which it typically does). We also must run counter to the near-universal notion among
conservatives that regulations never have positive effects for business which may create a
resistance to our platform not dissimilar to climate denial as a whole. When combined, these
factors make discussing regulations very difficult among climate deniers without incurring more
negative reactions than positive ones. Therefore, regulations should be less of a priority when
introducing climate policy with these groups. We must talk of climate change regulations to the
general public, but concerning channels where we most frequently find climate deniers, such
talks should be pursued at a time and place when the listening populations are much less
polarized against them. To that end, we can discuss other, less inflammatory types of climate
change policy until belief in climate change is less polarized overall, taking the other approaches
in this section as well as those later in this chapter.
Empathy and the “Other”
We have encountered plenty of evidence that people who deny climate change are not (on
average) able to empathize as successfully as non-deniers with people of high social distance.
Current theories argue that this lack of empathy allows climate change (belief in climate change)
to be viewed as less important by the denier, because the results are not as consequential to
anyone they care about (Hart & Nisbet, 2012). This poses a problem: even if climate deniers are
interested in the benefits of economic subsidies to new industries, they may still be disinclined to
support climate change efforts because they find them worthless. Inevitably, we will not be able
to convince everyone of the merits of climate policies, but we would stand to do better if we
could convince current deniers that people are legitimately in harm’s way if we do not take
collective action. Increasing empathy is a very difficult task, given that it is deeply tied to both
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one’s personal experiences and neural structure; however, we also understand that deniers’
empathy is still more or less average towards people of low social distance (Bernhardt & Singer,
2012; Hart & Nisbet, 2012). Therefore, instead of discussing the effects on people of high social
distance to the deniers, we would find most advantage discussing people of low social distance –
notably, people the deniers personally care about. I recommend appealing to the protection of
deniers’ children, not just in a general sense as has been common in political rhetoric, but by
discussing the detailed consequences on their lives if the deniers choose not to support broad
reforms. The additional benefit of empathy is that it enables deniers to consider the effects of
their actions and beliefs mostly without the interference of their ideologies. Not only do deniers
now have an incentive to listen, but the element of compassion forces them out of an abstracted,
almost cold calculus in which one is most concerned if the facts line up. In this case, the facts we
present will not line up with the climate deniers’ understanding of the facts so this presents us
with an opening for them to consider the consequences of their viewpoint if they are in fact
wrong. These moments are unlikely to be singular and revelatory, but instead a series of
empathic shifts towards believing in climate change through the bias of love for their family.
Here, we are most definitely using the unconscious mind of climate deniers to win their favor,
but it is towards an epistemologically sound conclusion that also happens to grant safety to their
loved ones in supporting it.
Redirecting Elitist Anxieties of Conservatives
Up until this point in the chapter, we have discussed how to frame climate change policy
reform in a light which will appeal to conservative minds and unconsciously influence climate
deniers to consider the ethics and reasonability of their viewpoint. In essence, we have aimed to
eliminate conservative objections to climate change policy. Nevertheless, the conservative mind
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will continue to linger in these individuals even if we help them to change their minds through
these methods. We have previously detailed that conservatives are, on a neurological level, much
more prone to dislike (and act reactively towards) uncertainty, ambiguity, and threats (Kanai,
Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011; Jost & Amodio, 2012). As a result, I speculate that the removal of
the climate science “boogeyman” will not leave previously climate-denying conservatives
satisfied and non-anxious without some new perceived threat. This is because conservatives’
tendency to react so strongly against threats likely makes the thought of one threat (i.e. climate
change conspiracies) suddenly vanishing seem unsettling in itself, unless there is an explanation
found in yet another threat (i.e. the climate denial machine) (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016).
Fortunately, our analysis in Chapter 3 leaves us well equipped to detail the story of the climate
denial machine and make them out to be a threat in much the same way as climate scientists
were.
Though researching what factors most strongly cause someone to find a person or group
threatening is a difficult task, and has not been done in the context of climate science as far as I
have found, I will outline my hypotheses here based on the information we have collected over
Chapters 2 and 3. Based on these hypotheses, I aim to create a preliminary strategy to redirect
conservatives to find the climate denial machine threatening and justify their previous
perceptions of threats by the denial machine’s manipulation.
Strategies
Our literature reviews on the climate denial machine and the psychological variables
surrounding climate denial leave us rather well prepared to consider the ways in which we can
make the climate denial machine appear threatening to conservatives, though we do not wish to
be intellectually dishonest as they were. The best analogy we have available is likely the events
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of Climategate. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, a biased selection of emails was released from
a university’s climate science research section, distributed online, and was given massive media
coverage, which led to significant drops in trust of climate scientists in the United States. These
steps can be generalized to be of more use to us:
(1) Find incriminating evidence on the group you wish to have perceived as a threat
(2) Spread the evidence so it is easily accessible to the populations you wish to influence
(3) Create media coverage to compound upon the impressions of the shared evidence
The key difference in our own behavior, of course, will be that we must find legitimate
evidence, and ensure to the best of our abilities that the evidence is legitimate before spreading it.
It is important, however, to create contrasts between the climate denial machine and climate
scientists when it comes to incrimination. Climate science, like essentially all science, is held to a
very high standard of objectivity and peer review. It is expected that the results created by
science come from a falsifiable and well-reasoned base which is not polluted by partisanship.
The same standard is not held to most other institutions, including those mainly heading the
climate denial machine.
Yet, this potential weakness becomes a strength when we consider the interaction of the
climate denial machine on the scientific process. We can name a myriad of examples of science
abuse, a concept we exhausted in Chapter 3, that have been committed by the climate denial
machine and its associated branches. We can explicitly identify institutions which have funded
and operated front groups which produce “scientific” reports to give the air of legitimacy to their
claims. We can note a myriad of times, across institutions and across scientific topics, where the
same individuals have been brought in to create a cloud of uncertainty about scientific findings
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to extend the process of Deny  Delay  Divest for as long as possible. In essence, we can say
of the climate denial machine, “These people tried to break science and hurt people for money.”
This claim couples two factors which I predict will be damning in the eyes of the public:
(1) the climate denial machine created a rhetoric to make money even if it seriously hurts the
lives of Americans and (2) they manipulated the institutions that we trust. The latter is especially
powerful because for as sacred as we view science as a society, these people (successfully)
conspired to undermine it for decades. This level and systemization of science abuse rivals, if not
surpasses, all of the charges made by the climate denial machine against scientific organizations.
It should be acknowledged that not all Americans appreciate science or scientists in the
same capacity. American citizens generally are very happy with science; a great majority think it
has improved the quality of life of people, believe American scientific achievements are among
the best in the world, and consider government funding for scientific research worthwhile in the
long run (Funk & Rainie, 2015). Compared to most fields of work, scientists are viewed to be
very competent, but for many, they are still not trustworthy. Some have predicted this
phenomenon is due to not being perceived as warm individuals, which almost always receive
admiration and a sense of internal pride when linked with competence (Huber, 2014).

78

Overall, I argue this means that people respect science, even if they do not always respect
scientists. What this allows us to do is create appeals to the studies that have benefitted the world
and made America the power it is today (as most people believe).
Another important aspect of ensuring our methods are effective is personifying the
climate denial machine so that it is seen as something that can sensibly be ascribed blame. I
believe this to be an important component of our platform because of two comparable attributes
of climate denier behavior: the use of Al Gore as the face of climate science among deniers and
the consistent use of front organizations by science abusers. The climate denial machine has
ensured that no individuals of reputable status are directly tied to activities which abuse science,
and attempts to make out climate believers as science abusers; for instance, Al Gore is often
mentioned in climate change discussions among conservatives, and is considered so illegitimate
a figure that his belief in climate science makes climate change seem immediately untrustworthy.
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Of the accounts we examined, it appears the largest criticism made of Gore is that he heavily
profited from his documentary An Inconvenient Truth, again lending to the belief that climate
science exists only for the gain (fame, money or otherwise) of those on the Left (Hoffman,
2011).
In our own strategy, we may choose to identify individuals in the climate denial machine
who are quite visible to the general public, difficult to remove from the public eye once his / her
reputation starts to degrade, and are very easy to dislike (particularly for conservatives). A recent
example where this was particularly potent in U.S. politics is Martin Shkreli, often called
“Pharma Bro” and “the most hated man in America,” who incidentally helped to create a
dialogue about the private sector’s free reign on drug pricing after his company bought a drug
license and raised the price over fifty times the original. Figures like Shkreli will be hard to come
by in our case, because his behavior was not only very directly tied to the suffering of others, but
he showed virtually no remorse for his actions, embraced his media presence for some time, and
acted and communicated in ways many thought to be highly distasteful. It can be expected that
the climate denial machine’s calculative nature will prevent such a figure from easily arising, but
with enough investigation, we may be able to find someone that we expect will act similarly and
has a past associated with climate science abuse.
This last step, while providing a crucial transition between climate denial and the
rejection of climate-denying institutions, is filled with potential ethical pitfalls. This plan must be
sharply distinguished from villainization of the individual(s) in question in order to be humane.
We will not seek to slander or mislead; rather, we will bring attention to lies, distortions, and
conflicts of interest by individuals within the climate denial machine. We are not suggesting to
scapegoat any individual, but we must speak truth to power and challenge those who lead the
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climate denial machine. This redirection of distrust must be due to well-investigated, neutral
demonstrations of the individuals’ character and actions. To that end, I will first list the potential
ethical concerns that come up from this plan:
(1) The easily disliked nature of the individual will make it easier for us to produce
slanderous materials rather than ones which merely reveal their character and actions.
(2) Our strong interest in revealing their corrupt activities (if / where they exist) and
creating distrust towards them provides us an incentive to less closely screen the
information we investigate and release to the public.
These are serious issues which need to be addressed, even if they are ultimately
manageable. To prevent these concerns from becoming reality and interfering with both our
goals and moral compasses, we must tightly tailor our strategy; I suggest the following rules to
counter each of the above concerns:
(1) Where easily disliked attributes are concerned, only describe the actions within the
media through video or direct quotation; allow the individual(s) to speak for
themselves rather than offering analysis.
(2) All releases of information on these targets must include only thoroughly vetted and
confirmed information from reliable sources, preferably who are available for future
comment and elaboration.
This narrowing of the techniques we will use in creating distrust towards specific climate
deniers should ensure that our actions are justified and representative of the reality of their
behavior. However, when put into practice, we must exercise caution in case there are other
variables which I have not identified here which could jeopardize our ethics in different ways.
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Where moral ambiguity comes into place, we must side towards the least detrimental result, even
if it limits the potency of the results we get in our media reports.
Defusing Common Rationales of Climate Deniers
Having discussed how to interact with climate deniers’ unconscious minds, we can now
move on to directly challenging their arguments. As we covered in Chapter 2, the claims made
by climate deniers are ones which have almost always already been considered and rejected by
climate science researchers, but are believed to legitimate counterarguments nevertheless.
Furthermore, Chapter 2 examined the notion of argument framing, where we found that people
on both sides of the climate change debate are using different argument frames and, therefore,
failing to contradict one another and force the other side to consider the validity of its point(s).
We must account for both of these traits of climate change communication if we wish to remove
all justifications of climate deniers and the climate denial machine.
Falsified Claims
Climate science has considered the phenomenon of climate change for several decades
and has had significant time to use the scientific method and academic critique to verify its
findings. Over those years, many objections came out against evidence and theories associated
with climate change, and while those objections did sometimes alter our understanding of the
phenomena causing or relating to climate change, no successful objection found that there was
another, superior explanation for the observations now associated with climate change (Cook, et
al., 2016). Still, these objections often arise within the climate denier literature and editorials
and, in non-academic circles, the understanding of climate science can be so limited that deniers
instead talk about weather. These objections are so varied and unlimited that it would be virtually
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impossible to cover them all, let alone in a project such as this, but what can be said is that each
of them deviates from a long and carefully constructed scientific theory, which by definition
explains the data associated with climate change with as few assumptions as possible.
Our concern is not to directly answer every objection that is made about climate science, but
instead answer those that have significant media attention or could rise in popularity. In the cases
where these objections are just newly trending reiterations of old objections, that attribute should
be pointed out so and quickly explain why it was rejected, so that it appears insignificant as a
response. However, we ought to enter conversations about these objections with more than the
mere finding that “climate change exists”. It must be clear that there has been significant
research to determine the human role in climate change and the dangers it poses. To that end, we
consider what climatologist Michael E. Mann calls the “six stages of climate change denial”
(Mann, 2013):
7. CO2 is not actually increasing.
8. Even if it is, the increase has no impact on the climate since there is no convincing
evidence of warming.
9. Even if there is warming, it is due to natural causes.
10. Even if the warming cannot be explained by natural causes, the human impact is small,
and the impact of continued greenhouse gas emissions will be minor.
11. Even if the current and future projected human effects on Earth's climate are not
negligible, the changes are generally going to be good for us.
12. Whether or not the changes are going to be good for us, humans are very adept at
adapting to changes; besides, it’s too late to do anything about it, and/or a technological
fix is bound to come along when we really need it.
This is a holistic representation of the objections that climate deniers can make to
sufficiently block interest in policy reform. To respond to each of these sufficiently is essentially
to eliminate any rational basis for climate denial. Thus, I have adapted Mann’s stages into our
own “seven stages of climate change communication”:
1. There is scientific consensus on the existence, causes, and solutions to climate change.
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2.
3.
4.
5.

CO2 is increasing.
There is evidence of warming in the climate due to CO2 increases and other GHGs.
This warming is due in part to human behavior.
The human impact is significant and the effects of continued greenhouse gas emissions
will be serious.
6. These significant changes to the climate are generally going to be negative and
widespread.
7. We will have a difficult time adapting to the changes in climate if they persist, we are
able to fix climate change now, and we cannot rely on a technological fix to save us.
Having our conversations begin by asserting these as well-grounded scientific facts will
allow us to immediately reject objections made by climate deniers. By the time their objections
come to light, it will have already been made clear that these are the findings of a vast majority
of scientists and to deviate without significant evidence is to be intellectually dishonest. Because
these facts will only be accepted based on a well-grounded consensus, stage 1 must be
emphasized; it is stage on which all the others rely.
In many types of media, such as on cable news interviews, it will be difficult to
immediately begin the conversation with all of these facts. Thus, we need to prioritize which
ones we mention to ensure they have maximum impact. Given that stage 1 establishes the others,
that is what must begin every conversation; if a false claim is made, we can at least say
“scientific findings actually show [corrected claim]”. Making it clear that the findings are well
established and very widely accepted means that the notion of a controversy is immediately shut
down. Without obscurity, the climate denial machine must be bolder in its rejection of scientific
institutions, and if we couple this approach alongside our reveal of the machine’s science abuse
history, it becomes much more likely that all but the most polarized members of the public will
find their representatives untrustworthy.
Argument Framing
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In Chapter 2, we investigated the notion that climate believers and climate deniers are
“talking past each other” in regards to the arguments surrounding climate change. We found a
selection of studies which determined that believers and deniers have been using distinct frames
of argument when discussing climate change, as well as different relevant topics; thus, even
when each side’s members encountered arguments from the other side, they were not having
their viewpoints challenged (Hoffman, 2011; Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Lambert, 2015).
The solution to this issue is rather straightforward: when combatting the arguments of deniers,
aim to directly contradict their perspectives. For example, we observed in these studies that about
90% of arguments made by climate deniers used a diagnostic frame of argument, and of those
argument frames, most centered around topics of science, mainly to question the scientific
validity of climate change. In contrast, most convinced arguers used a prognostic frame and risk
topic, so they were not challenging the arguments of the deniers. Not only should we challenge
pro-denial arguments with direct contradictions, but we should increase the proportion of probelief media which uses the frames and topics of deniers. This allows us to maximize the amount
of climate deniers who view arguments that run directly contrary to their own viewpoints.
Setbacks
We previously encountered that there were certain populations who would not be
receptive to the idea of climate change policy reform, even if they accepted the rational bases
from which we argue it is necessary. The most prominent of these are evangelical Christians who
believe in an Armageddon within the century (Barker & Bearce, 2012). While receptive to
helping with short-term sociotropic issues, the medium- to long-term effects of climate change
are viewed either as non-problematic or indicative of a Rapture-like event, which they view as
both necessary and unstoppable. Given that is reasonable for them not to aim to change
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something which is literally irrelevant or inevitable, we are unlikely to change their perspective
unless we remove their belief in Armageddon altogether, which is a very difficult task. Our best
hope in these circumstances is to promote climate change reform for the short-term effects on
individuals, since they believe people will still be on Earth to experience them. However, since
the effects of climate change increase more sharply as time goes on, the observed harms in the
short-term are unlikely to be a sufficient cause for significant reform among these Rapturers. We
can, however, promote the direct benefits of policy like jobs and wealth as we have with other
populations; under the reasoning of this group of Christians, these reforms will seem harmless at
worst, and beneficial at best. This is an enormous group of people, and may be the greatest
obstacle we face in our efforts; as said in Chapter 2, forty-one percent of Americans believe that
the Second Coming will happen by 2050, and of Americans, fifty-eight percent of white
evangelicals believe the same (Pew Research Center, 2010). While we can promote these
benefits to these groups, we are better off focusing on less religious populations if we wish to
have maximum impact.
Trusted Sources of Climate Deniers
I discussed in the section from Chapter 2 on political polarization that as people watch
media which corresponds with their view on climate change, the viewers continue to become
more polarized. Thus, to prevent further polarization, we need to eliminate consistent viewership
of climate denier media as much as possible. There are two main ways that we can do this: (1)
cause people to watch different media and (2) change the nature of the media’s view on climate
change. Both are exceedingly difficult tasks, but may be accomplishable to a certain degree.
Changing the political media outlets that an individual will observe is difficult mostly
because of the ties of partisanship to personal identity; people will choose to watch conservative
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media because they identify as conservatives, and subsequently identify as conservatives more
intensely through watching conservative media. We are unlikely to change the pervasiveness of
partisan media any time soon, let alone the psychological effect it has on individuals. Thus, if we
wish to eliminate the viewership of media which is climate denying, we must ensure that their
viewers have a similar, non-denying outlet to which they can easily migrate. This is no simple
task and would require not only the assurance that such non-denying outlets exist, but that one
could orchestrate the loss of interest in the previous outlets. Consequently, I do not recommend
this option unless the opportunity arises to do so easily, which I expect to be exceedingly rare.
While also difficult, we may have more luck in swaying the viewpoints of some
conservative outlets. Naturally, not all conservative spokespeople are climate deniers, even if
they are employed at businesses who mostly deliver climate-denying reports. We may be able to
form partnerships with those spokespeople who see the need to address climate change, and have
them advocate on behalf of more conservative-friendly aspects of climate policy reform. Priority
ought to be given to spokespeople who have the largest viewership within the most climatedenying regions whose viewers are not mostly believers in the Rapture. This strategy will
maximize the amount of coverage our message receives by climate deniers, while also ensuring
those deniers have incentive to change their viewpoint. Our approach has a secondary benefit,
which is that the advocacy for belief in climate change by a conservative spokesperson will
encourage the separation of climate denial from conservative identity, while also granting a level
of trust from the shared identity. These relationships will be crucial to creating a peaceful and
ongoing dialogue about the reality of climate change, since the lack of resistance in building
rapport with our audience will allow us to be much more successful than we might be otherwise.
Chapter Summary
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Thus far, we have examined why climate change is worrisome and needs reform, what
psychological variables contribute to climate denial, and how the climate denial machine
influences people to reject climate change research. Next, we need to create a plan to reaffirm
belief in climate change to bolster incentive for policy reform. However, in order to do that, we
must combine our knowledge of climate deniers’ psychology and sociocultural influences to find
out how to undo the incentives that create disregard for climate research and arguments, and
instead, ultimately, lead them to believe in climate change. That has been the goal of this chapter.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we can combine it with other data to identify climate denier populations,
media outlets, and spokespeople to create a concrete policy recommendation.
Dissecting the different reasons why people deny climate change allows us to take more
effective steps to counter those reasons directly, and create unique strategies for each of their
reasons. As we explored in Chapter 2, with the exception of apathetic populations driven by
religiosity, climate change denial largely stems from system justification, low empathy for high
social distance individuals, and personally identifying as a conservative (with conservatism’s
link to climate change denial). Thus, we need to undo these links by (respectively) making
climate change policy harmless (or at least seem harmless) to the current sociopolitical order, use
people of low social distance to deniers to cultivate empathy, and use level-headed, well-known
conservative figures to build trust and create dialogues with climate deniers about legitimate
climate science. Additionally, we may be able to use the uncanny levels of anti-authoritarianism
among conservatives (including climate deniers) to direct distrust away from climate scientists,
who use a horizontal, peer-reviewed system of fact checking, and instead towards the network of
donors and front groups which manipulate people into becoming climate deniers in the first
place. However, we must be quite cautious here in order to avoid allowing this to be framed as a
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Leftist agenda, which may cause the opposite of the intended effect by further linking climate
belief exclusively to the Left.
With these generalized strategies, we can now take our theories and put them into a
policy suggestion to be implemented in concrete places and in concrete ways. Chapter 5 will
concern itself with this project, but it has only been possible with the context that has been
provided with the previous chapters to this point. To that end, when we begin plotting our
recommendations, we must be sure not only to plan with these strategies in mind, but with the
institutional analyses and minute psychological details we have made to this point; they may
determine whether the proposal is only effective in the abstract, or understands the field enough
to effectively lead to change in public opinion on climate change.
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Preface
We have reached the final stage of this project: suggesting a policy recommendation to
reduce climate change denial in the United States. In Chapter 1, we described climate change and
its negative effects; in Chapter 2, we analyzed the psychology and argument structures of climate
deniers; in Chapter 3, we studied the climate denial machine and its effects on climate change
policy and belief; and in Chapter 4, we used prior theory to craft plans to reduce climate change
denial in the United States. Now, we aim to take the strategies from Chapter 4 and create explicit
recommendations for climate science organizations and other nonpartisan institutions to enact.
These plans are not capable of entirely ending the phenomenon of climate change denial, nor are
they intended to do so. Instead, they are designed to help reduce the proportion of citizens who
deny climate change so that they may be motivated to enact policy reform and work to mitigate
climate change’s effects. Though this project has limitations due to scope and time, I believe that
the recommendations outlined here can produce effective results and should be enacted.
The themes of our plan are threefold: (1) recommend climate change policy reforms
which appeal to conservatives in order to continue mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, (2)
expose the climate denial machine to the general public, and (3) influence conservative media to
discuss the dangers of climate change and nonpartisan policy reforms. If each component is
enacted, these plans will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, strengthen conservatives’ interest in
climate change policy, and reduce trust in climate denial institutions. These effects should not
only mitigate the effects of climate change beyond the status quo, but may even increase support
for more significant climate change reforms in the near future.
Proposed Climate Change Platform
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Chapter 1 detailed the need for climate change policy reform; now, we begin to suggest
forms of reform which will likely be viewed positively by conservatives who would otherwise
resist climate change policies. These policies will not only be framed in terms of conservative
values to appropriate audiences, but will be created and written by nonpartisan and/or
conservative organizations, lending to their legitimacy. While these policies are unlikely to
completely decrease greenhouse gas production to safe levels, they will still have a positive
effect on the environment and should be pursued.
Policies
We will recommend two main policy reforms concerning climate change: increased
short-term state subsidies for alternative energy companies and the instatement of local, state
and/or federal carbon taxes. Subsidy and tax rates will not be considered here. Because the aim is
to first produce a set of policies which are appealing to conservative voters and would not face
significant backlash provided they are reasonable in the amount of money they pay out and take
in (respectively). Additionally, I will not discuss which level of government to pursue for the
carbon tax bill(s) because this is beyond the scope of the current project.
Short-term economic subsidies provided by state governments have already been
demonstrated to easily make the United States operate entirely from clean, renewable energy
resources by 2050 (The Solutions Project, 2017). As we explored in Chapter 4, these subsidies
can be made out to be an enormous benefit to the national economy and provide a surge of new,
well-paying jobs. Furthermore, the diversity in alternative energy resources, ranging from
geothermal to wind to ocean tides to roof solar panels, permits job creation in areas where
resources are largely insufficient to produce other utilities. All the while, these innovations will
rapidly increase the process at which we reach completely greenhouse-gas free, renewable
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energy. The Solutions Project, a nonprofit, outlines expected returns for these short-term
investments. For instance, in my home state of Pennsylvania, it is expected these alternative
energies would provide about 400,000 new jobs where people are employed for 40 years or
more, prevent over 3,000 air pollution deaths a year, save $21.6 billion in health costs annually
(~2% of the state’s GDP), and save over $12,000 per person annually when combining the
savings from energy, health, and climate spending (The Solutions Project, 2017). Considering
the enormous benefits that are outlined by these programs, and the use of private organizations to
produce this energy, we should not expect incredibly high resistance from conservatives if our
evaluation of why they dislike climate change policies is to be trusted. However, those that still
believe coal and similar products should be economic mainstays may be upset with this policy.
While this number is relatively small and may be offset by the advantages mentioned here, we
may be able to overcome this division by mentioning the quality of life improvements that come
from moving beyond coal (Riffkin, 2015). Coal is notoriously dangerous, with a long history of
mining disasters, known ties to various lung diseases, and coal dust explosions (United States
Department of Labor, n.d.; Laney & Weissman, 2014; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2011). All of this avoided by switching to alternative energies, in addition to
providing more economically sound jobs as these energies eventually expand, with or without
subsidies.
The notion of a carbon tax originated from conservative scholars and is still lauded by
them to this day; it is argued that the effects of carbon emissions should incur a direct penalty,
which is delivered in the form of a tax, and is then redistributed to the people affected. This
redistribution is not viewed as a matter of equity but of compensation for losses caused by the
greenhouse gas producers. When redistributed, the funds of the tax may be offered at a flat
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amount to all citizens of the relevant government body or it may be scaled to benefit those who
are most affected, most in need, or some other metric. For our purposes, I maintain that the use
of a flat tax is ideal; it prevents the tax from being perceived as a government tool for equity,
which is a typically disliked concept among conservatives. A flat redistribution is considered the
most agreeable among those who dislike equity programs while it will not necessarily draw the
ire of liberals since it improves upon the status quo. To ensure that American businesses are still
able to compete with others around the world, and so companies do not decide to leave the
United States, experts also agree that we ought to implement import fees on products who do not
institute their own carbon tax and rebate industries who export to those countries (Citizens'
Climate Lobby, 2016). This also allows the United States to also pursue its role as a leader in
climate policy.
Framing of Policies
As mentioned previously, neither of these policies will be framed to conservatives as
tools for equity. Instead, they must be perceived as means to desirable improvements in
employment, energy savings, and healthcare costs by minor alterations to existing markets.
Depending on how effective our blame of the climate denial machine is, we may be able to
further reinforce the necessity of a carbon tax as a punitive measure for their wrongdoings, which
may allow us to increase the tax rate. We might also rely on the support of a variety of analysts
at conservative / center-right think tanks, including the R Street Institute, the Niskanen Center,
and the American Enterprise Institute, though we must be careful of some of the links they have
to the climate denial machine (R Street Institute, 2014; Niskanen Center, 2015; American
Enterprise Institute, 2015). However, we should only do so if we believe their contribution will
give greater legitimacy and breadth in understanding among conservative academics and
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politicians, since these are the frequenters of conservative think tank publications. The policies
themselves must be framed as providing immense benefit for little cost, and should focus on
individual benefits to voters and not abstract the information to a wider population; this will
ensure that social distance does not deter interest in the policies’ results. For example,
nonpartisan group Citizens’ Climate Lobby calculates that a family of four would receive a
sizeable amount of money each year from the carbon tax, starting from only an initial fee of
$15/ton of CO2-equivalent gas emissions and rising $10/ton/year (Citizens' Climate Lobby, n.d.).

(Citizens' Climate Lobby, n.d.).
Perhaps the greatest element of this policy (at least for our purposes) is that its benefits
are easily understood by citizens, even climate deniers; they will be directly receiving money if
the law is passed, rather than the funds going towards “big government” programs. This forces
those who see climate policy as fundamentally bad to reconcile it with their own self-interests,
especially amidst the other, more passive benefits that these programs espouse. The policies
break all the conventions typically associated with climate policy and are easily demonstrable as
a good change even for those in positions of power within society. As a result, we should expect
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significantly less resistance and have the potential to sway voters who would otherwise be
apathetic towards or against traditional climate policies.
Exposure of the Climate Denial Machine
As we recommend these policies, we must try to eliminate the inevitable pushback of the
climate denial machine, as is natural from their Deny  Delay  Divest behavior. In Chapter 4,
we explored how to do this by identifying specific institutions of the climate denial machine and
the actions of specific members of the climate denying machine, and using the media to expose
their actions and to the public. Here, we will find potential climate denial machine members who
would be well suited for this role, outline general plans to spread their information, and detail the
responses we may receive and how we should react to them.
Ideal Target
By now, we are very familiar with the fact that climate denial machine consistently uses
front groups to disguise the source of their funding which can make it difficult to know who is to
blame. Nevertheless, we have established that identifying individuals who are active in the
climate denial machine would be in our best interests. I detail below a well-known politician who
I have identified as an active participant in the climate denial machine. It should be noted that
individuals who are exposed will be publicized to people across the nation, rather than selecting
multiple people and targeting them by geographic region. This allows us to create a story with
much less research than would otherwise be necessary and also allows citizens to focus on one
climate denial machine member rather than multiple. This keeps our message short and potent.
Scott Pruitt is the new head of the Environmental Protection Agency and was considered
one its most committed opponents before being appointed to the position. Under his (and Donald
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Trump’s) leadership, the agency has greatly reduced its projects and spending. Pruitt rejects the
scientific consensus that CO2 emissions are the primary contributor to climate change, though he
concedes that such changes exist and are likely to be somewhat caused by humanity (Dennis &
Mooney, 2017). In February of this year, Pruitt was ordered by a judge to release his email
records with fossil fuel industry representatives, as is required under public records laws; these
records reveal incredibly close connections, including an assortment of personal meetings, phone
calls, and dinners with fossil fuel industry members (Dennis & Mufson, 2017). Many of these
interactions had Pruitt’s office requesting policy recommendations from oil and gas companies
like Devon Energy, though Pruitt defended these interactions as merely listening to his
constituents. Nevertheless, he also received over $300,000 from the industry while working as
Oklahoma attorney general (Dennis & Mufson, 2017).
The greatest benefit to targeting Scott Pruitt is that his position as EPA chief makes him
incredibly vulnerable to weakening both the Trump White House and the reputation of climate
denial if he resigns. He is associated with an administration whose president’s poll numbers (at
least as of writing) continue to fall, he has many counterparts in other departments who are either
under criminal investigation or have already resigned due to public upset, and he lacks the
confidence to brazenly contradict the scientific consensus on climate change when pressed hard
during interviews (Wang, 2017; Gallup, 2017; Shear, 2017). If more evidence can be found that
suggests his relationship with fossil fuel companies, particularly Devon, are more than mere
friendliness, he can be charged with corruption, and weaken trust with both the Trump
administration and their informants. This victory would also raise grounds to legally object to the
sweeping administrative changes that the EPA underwent under Pruitt’s command, which could
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potentially restore many regulations which protect the public, both concerning climate change
and other environmental topics.
Altering Conservative Media
We have spoken at length about the ways in which conservative media channels further
polarize conservatives against climate change policy reform when they reject the scientific
consensus on climate change (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009; Feldman, Meyers,
Hmielowski, & Leiserowitz, 2014).This is something which is most effectively countered by
changing the content that these channels provide, and we can ensure that we choose the most
effective channels by investigating what attributes their viewership have. The first section below
will investigate these viewership attributes; the second, the kinds of methods we should use; and
the third, the conservative spokespeople we should request assistance from in our mission.
Demography / Geography
We aim to find out where viewers are most likely to be climate deniers, but also can be
convinced. To that end, we can see where the variables that we have researched in previous
chapters are most prominent, and cross-reference them on a United States map. For example, we
discovered that belief in the Rapture will significantly decrease interest in traditional kinds of
climate change reform; we can use percentage of religiosity per county as a proxy for this
concept in the figure below and see where those kinds of citizens live.
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(JayMan, 2013)
We see three areas where we can expect minimal progress: upper Texas, Utah, and most
of the Dakotas. While these are known as mostly conservative states, it is clear that there are
areas where religiosity is not as high but conservatism is prevalent. Consider this proxy in the
figure below for political polarization, the results by candidate’s percentage of the vote for the
2012 presidential election.
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(Wikipedia, 2017)
One can see that, while the three aforementioned areas are most certainly conservative,
other areas of the country are as well, such as the area surrounding Tennessee, and the stretch
from Nebraska to Oklahoma. We will also encounter that many psychological variables, which
are proxied here through responses to a survey conducted by the Yale Program for Climate
Change Communication, yield similar results. The map below presents the results, compared to
the national average, of respondents that agreed “global warming will harm me personally,”
which will act here as a proxy for personal concern.
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(Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016)
Our goal is to influence those areas which are conservative, low in personal concern of
climate change, and are not believers in the Rapture. Using these three maps now and continued
research in the future, we can isolate the counties which meet these three attributes, which still
appear to be mostly those areas around Tennessee and through Nebraska to Oklahoma. Our final
map shows areas of the country where people are struggling the most, based on a composition
value of education, median household income, unemployment rate, disability rate, life
expectancy and obesity (Flippen, 2014). This measure will stand as a potential proxy for interest
in a policy reform which provides more jobs, like our alternative energy subsidies.
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(Fippen, 2014)
In all, this multivariate view of people’s attributes allows us to narrow our considerations
down to a few isolated regions. These will be the ones whose channels we will mainly target for
our advocacy, though we can always expand to other regions of comparable attributes if our
resources and connections make it possible.
Methods
In order to reach these people within conservative media, we must ensure that they do not
perceive our intervention as a sort of liberal hostile takeover. This would only give credence to
the existent paranoia about liberal authoritarianism surrounding climate change policy. Thus, we
cannot do such things as air pro- climate change ads amidst programs which are anti- climate
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change and expect the viewers’ narratives to change. Instead, we must actively find interested
conservative participants in these media regions to advocate for our platform on their channels.
As discussed in Chapter 4, this method will maximize trust and salience of our message. This
outreach can vary considerably in depth depending on the resources of the organizations using
this plan. For example, we may aim to only cooperate with local news stations and radio shows
within the Tennessee and Nebraska regions; alternately, we may have the finances and
connections to be able to reach national television. Any progress would be positive, but we
should aim to reach as many potentially cooperative spokespeople as possible so as to maximize
the spread of our message.
Additionally, our interactions with the media, whether through our own representatives or
through spokespeople that we engage with, ought to follow the rules outlined in Chapter 4.
Namely, we should apply the seven steps of climate change communication and the use of
climate deniers’ framing. We want to be directly contradicting the claims and beliefs of climate
deniers with hard evidence, rather than immediately progressing to suggesting policy reform (at
least in these channels). From a trusted source, this information should be salient and could
positively affect the beliefs of climate deniers considerably.
Ideal Conservative Spokesperson
Though it is beyond the scope of this current project to identify conservative
spokespeople who would be a good match for our platform, I will offer an example of an
individual I have identified as being supportive of our measures. He will serve not serve as an
essential partner for our work (though his help is welcomed), but instead should be seen as a
model for the type of person we may pursue within any given type of conservative media.
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Chris Wallace was the first person I considered for this type of conservative advocacy
after seeing his performance as moderator during the first presidential debate, which was met
with high praise across the partisan divide (Hackett, 2016). He delivered himself in a balanced
and nonpartisan fashion, despite being known for his position on conservative news station FOX,
which we had found earlier to be the most watched news station in the United States. Recently,
his interview with Scott Pruitt was “panned by both climate change advocates and skeptics alike”
and followed essentially the same protocol created in Chapter 4’s seven stages of climate change
communication, mentioning the key facts at the beginning of the conversation and following up
on the lack of controversy within the scientific community (Wang, 2017). Due to these instances,
Wallace is a respected spokesperson across the political spectrum and it is clear that he
understands and acknowledges the consequences of climate change. His commentary is balanced
and is perceived as such according to several cited articles. Wallace’s reputation and history
combine four key traits that we ought to value when choosing spokespeople: trustworthiness to
conservatives, nonpartisanship, belief and concern of the effects of climate change, and respect
across the partisan divide. If we can find these traits in others and they agree to advocate on our
behalf, we can expect them to serve our cause well.
Chapter Summary
Throughout this chapter, we have created a multifaceted strategy which aims to reduce
climate denial and climate-denying policies in a multitude of ways. Firstly, we aimed to
encourage the passing of two separate policies on climate change, namely an increase in
alternative energy subsidies and the implementation of a carbon tax. Secondly, we aimed to
expose quid pro quo ties to an individual associated with fossil fuel companies in order to
dismantle the reputation and political power of the climate denial machine. Lastly, we aimed to
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isolate potentially swayed climate deniers and create a model for spokespeople that will assist us
in depolarizing them. The construction of these strategies could not have been done without the
careful building of evidence throughout the first three chapters, alongside their combination into
explicit theories in Chapter 4. This chapter is the culminating piece in this thesis.
However, the information and plans presented in this text are not meant to be read and
applied in isolation. There are many related and intersecting topics which undoubtedly will affect
the ideas developed here. In many ways, this is a first step in a long process to improve policy
and outcomes on climate change. The research, ideas, and policy proposals developed here
should be understood as a guide to begin to mitigate the effects of climate change, in part by
increasing understanding for its long-term ramifications.
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As we conclude our examination of climate change denial and its reduction, we ought
also reflect on the steps we took throughout. We began with Chapter 1, which introduces the
premises of our work: that human-caused climate change exists, that it is harming the planet, that
we need public consensus on climate change to produce sufficient policy reform, and that such a
consensus does not currently exist. Chapter 2 produced a literature review on the psychological
influences of climate change denial, which allowed us to understand why someone would reject
the scientific consensus on climate change. In Chapter 3, we analyzed the basis of science abuse,
the institutions of climate change denial, and how the two are linked, which allowed us to see
how the climate denial machine perpetuated denial among United States citizens. Chapter 4 took
our studies from Chapters 2 and 3, and used them to craft general plans on how to interrupt the
goals of the climate denial machine, while also beginning to undo the psychological variables of
climate denial and create our own institutions to move citizens towards climate change belief.
Lastly, Chapter 5 took the general plans of Chapter 4 and produced explicit policy
recommendations.
These recommendations offer promising advances in our efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, but it is unlikely that they alone will be sufficient to stop global temperatures from
rising. There will need to be more climate policies implemented, and to that end, we will have to
produce yet greater majorities in public opinion, or increase the potency of our movements.
Additionally, these policies will need to be implemented far beyond the United States, and
beyond even global superpowers; wherever greenhouse gases arise, we will need to moderate
them to prevent significant warming. Each of these topics is not only deserving of its own
research, but of paramount importance.
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I would also like to credit the people who have helped me throughout the process of
writing this work, which is my largest piece to date: my family and friends, who provided me
with support and patience; my advisor Rachel Moskowitz, who took on the enormous project of
teaching me to manage such a large document; and the Public Policy and Law department at
Trinity College, for further empowering me to produce literature that can shape the world.
Lastly, I would like to reflect upon the seriousness of this writing and those like it, as was
done in our introduction. Setting aside from the fate of our planet, the fate of our cultures and
democracies depend on a shared understanding of reason and knowledge. This understanding
allows us not only to create masterpieces and accomplish feats that can dramatically reshape the
human experience, but creates a healthy consensus on facts on which we can rely. This
conclusion extends far beyond climate change policy, or even science policy; whenever there are
facts at the center of our debates, we must not give in to a factual nihilism, or else we stand to
break the policymaking process entirely. Without good policy, we stand to lose almost
everything. I hope that our considerations in this work will convince you of this point, and if it
does, I hope it stays with you as you read far different works.
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